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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC MACROECONOMICS
Hikaru Saijo
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
This dissertation consists of two chapters that study substantive and methodological
issues in business cycle research.
In the first chapter, I study a business cycle model where agents learn about the
state of the economy through accumulating capital. During recessions, agents invest
less, and this generates noisier estimates of macroeconomic conditions and an increase
in uncertainty. The endogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty further reduces
economic activity, which in turn leads to more uncertainty, and so on. Thus, through
changes in uncertainty, learning gives rise to a multiplier effect that amplifies business
cycles. I calibrate the model to measure the size of this uncertainty multiplier and find
that it is large. Moreover, the model quantitatively replicates the VAR relationship
between output and uncertainty.
In the second chapter, I evaluate the common practice of estimating dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models using seasonally adjusted data.1 The
simulation experiment shows that the practice leads to sizeable distortions in esti-
mated parameters. This is because the effects of seasonality, which are magnified by
the model’s capital accumulation and labor market frictions, are not restricted to the
so-called seasonal frequencies but instead are propagated across the entire frequency
1This chapter is published in the Journal of Econometrics.
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Chapter 1
The Uncertainty Multiplier and
Business Cycles
1.1 Introduction
A central criticism of modern business cycle theories is that they require an un-
realistic magnitude of primitive shocks to fit the data. For example, plain vanilla
real business cycle models need to invoke sizable technological regress in order to
explain recessions. Motivated by this challenge, a rapidly growing literature argues
that shocks to uncertainty are a significant driver of business cycle dynamics—see,
for example, Bloom (2009), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011), Gourio (2012), and
Christiano et al. (2012). However, this literature also faces an important criticism
similar to that of the standard theories. While various proxies of uncertainty rise
during almost all recessions,1 exogenous events that significantly increase the volatil-
1See, for example, Bloom et al. (2012).
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ity of the economy seem to be rare. This observation suggests that fluctuations
in uncertainty may be, at least partially, endogenous. The distinction is crucial.
For example, if uncertainty is an equilibrium object, policy experiments that treat
uncertainty as exogenous are subject to the Lucas critique.
In this paper, I present a quantitative business cycle model where the level of
economic activity influences the level of aggregate uncertainty. The endogenous
movement in uncertainty, in turn, affects the level of economic activity. I demonstrate
that this two-way feedback between economic activity and uncertainty is important
for understanding business cycles.
The model builds on a standard equilibrium business cycle framework with several
real and nominal rigidities (Christiano et al. 2005). I introduce information frictions
by subjecting the economy to aggregate shocks that agents cannot directly observe,
namely, shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment and shocks to the depreciation
rate of capital. Because the former are persistent while the latter are transitory, what
matters for agents’ optimal decision is the evolution of the efficiency of investment.
Agents use the path of capital stock and investment to form their estimates in a
Bayesian manner.2 However, the capital stock is not perfectly revealing about the
unobservable shocks because it is subject to a non-invertibility problem: Agents
cannot tell whether an unexpectedly high realization of capital stock is due to a high
efficiency of investment or to a low depreciation rate of capital.
In the model, the level of investment endogenously determines the informativeness
2In the model, all information necessary for optimal learning is contained in the path of capital
stock and investment. While agents have access to other endogenous variables, including prices,
they do not reveal additional information about the unobservable shocks.
2
of the capital stock about the shocks to the efficiency of investment. When agents
invest less, their estimates are imprecise because the level of capital stock is largely
determined by the realization of the depreciation shock. Conversely, when they invest
more, their estimates are accurate because the current capital mostly reflects shocks
to the efficiency of investment. Thus, aggregate uncertainty becomes endogenously
countercyclical over the business cycle.
The countercyclical uncertainty gives rise to a novel multiplier effect that am-
plifies business cycles. Imagine that the economy is hit by a negative shock that
lowers investment (for example, an exogenous tightening of monetary policy). Since
agents learn less about the current period shock to the efficiency of investment, un-
certainty increases. This, in turn, further reduces investment and other economic
activity because of households’ precautionary motive and countercyclical movements
in markups. The opposite channel works when the economy is hit by a positive
shock. I call this amplification mechanism the uncertainty multiplier.
To measure the size of the uncertainty multiplier, I perform numerical simulations.
Since my purpose is to investigate the direct effect of changes in uncertainty, I go
beyond linear approximations and use a third-order perturbation method to solve
the model. In a standard first-order approximation, changes in uncertainty play no
role, since the decision rules of agents are forced to follow a certainty equivalence
principle. In the second-order approximation, changes in uncertainty only appear
in the decision rules as cross-product terms with other state variables. Only in the
third-order approximation do changes in uncertainty show up as an independent
term.
3
The model is calibrated to match the business cycle properties of the postwar
U.S. quarterly data. An interesting challenge I face is that the choice of the vari-
ance parameters has important effects on the strength of learning dynamics. More
specifically, when the variance of the depreciation shock is too small compared to
that of the shock to the efficiency of investment, the capital stock is almost perfectly
revealing about the shock to the efficiency of investment. Conversely, when the de-
preciation shock is too large, the capital stock is uninformative and little learning
takes place. In both cases, fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty are negligible. To
ensure that agents face a realistic amount of information frictions, I pin down the
variance parameters so that the model replicates the properties of survey data on
macroeconomic forecasts.
The uncertainty multiplier is large. In particular, under the benchmark calibra-
tion the standard deviation of output is amplified by 33%. Other real variables, such
as investment and hours, are also amplified by a similar amount. The results are due
to two main features of the model. First, in my model changes in uncertainty gener-
ate positive comovements among real variables. Second, the uncertainty process is
volatile and persistent because it is tied to the movement of investment.
Finally, I provide an external validation of my theory by showing that it quanti-
tatively replicates the VAR impulse response of the survey measure of uncertainty.
In particular, it can account for the negative relationship between output and un-
certainty and it also reproduces gradual responses of the two variables. This is
because in the model uncertainty is inversely related to investment, which exhibits
hump-shaped dynamics, and this uncertainty in turn induces gradual adjustments
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by households. I conclude that the uncertainty multiplier could be a key force that
transforms relatively small shocks into larger business cycles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe
my contributions with respect to the existing literature. In Section 3, I present the
model. In Section 4, I discuss its solution and calibration. In Section 5, I present
the results. In Section 6, I provide evidence of my theory from survey data. Finally,
Section 7 concludes with some directions for future research.
1.2 Connections to the Literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it is related to a
growing literature on uncertainty shocks. A leading example is a paper by Bloom
(2009), who shows that an exogenous increase in the volatility of firm-level productiv-
ity reduces output through a “wait-and-see” effect due to investment irreversibility.
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) show that volatility shocks to real interest rates
generate sizable contractions in an otherwise standard small open economy model.
Other examples include Arellano et al. (2012), Basu and Bundick (2011), Chris-
tiano et al. (2012), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012), Gilchrist et al. (2010), Gourio
(2012), Ilut and Schneider (2011), and Schaal (2012). I show that time-varying un-
certainty could be an important amplification (rather than an impulse) mechanism
of the business cycle. As stated in the Introduction, this distinction is important
because now uncertainty is an equilibrium object.
Recently, some authors have argued that changes in uncertainty have negligible
5
effects given small and transient fluctuations in observed realized volatility (Bach-
mann and Bayer 2012, Born and Pfeifer 2012, and Chugh 2012). The problem of
this approach is that the realized volatility may not accurately reflect the actual
uncertainty that agents face. In fact, in my model, uncertainty features a large and
persistent fluctuation that is not linked with movements in the realized volatility of
macro variables.3 As a result, unlike in these papers, changes in uncertainty have
sizable effects.
Several papers attempt to explain the countercyclical firm-level volatility through
conventional first-moment shocks. For example, in Bachmann and Moscarini (2011),
recessions induce firms to price-experiment, which in turn raises the cross-sectional
dispersion of price changes. See also D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012), Kehrig (2011),
and Tian (2012). An important distinction between my paper and theirs is that,
while their models endogenously deliver ex-post volatility, mine delivers ex-ante un-
certainty. This is why in my model uncertainty is not merely a by-product of agents’
response to first-moment shocks, but rather an important factor that affects real
allocations.
The main mechanism of this paper builds on a literature on asymmetric learning,
for example, Veldkamp (2005), Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), Ordoñez (2012),
and Görtz and Tsoukalas (forthcoming). They argue that the time-varying speed
of learning about the macroeconomic conditions could explain the asymmetries in
growth rates over the business cycle. When the economy passes the peak of a boom,
agents are able to precisely detect the slowdown, leading to an abrupt crash. At
3Ilut and Schneider (2011) also propose a business cycle model where changes in uncertainty are
not followed by changes in realized volatility by assuming ambiguity-averse preferences.
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the end of the recession, agents’ estimates about the extent of recovery are noisy,
slowing reactions and delaying booms. My contribution is to explore the direct effects
of endogenous fluctuations in uncertainty that shift the levels of macro variables.
Recessions are deeper because high uncertainty leads precautionary households to
cut consumption. Booms are stronger for the opposite reason. This channel has
been overlooked in the previous literature.
Finally, this paper joins a long tradition in macroeconomics by considering the
role of imperfect information and expectations in shaping business cycle dynamics.
Recent contributions include Angeletos and La’o (forthcoming), Barsky and Sims
(2012), Beaudry and Portier (2004), Eusepi and Preston (2011), Lorenzoni (2009),
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). These papers
emphasize changes in the mean of agents’ subjective estimates about fundamentals.
The current paper, instead, demonstrates the importance of changes in the variance
of estimates about fundamentals.
1.3 The Model
I embed a learning problem into the capital accumulation process of a standard
monetary business cycle framework (Christiano et al. 2005, Justiniano et al. 2010, and
Smets andWouters 2007). This framework is a natural laboratory for my quantitative
investigation, since it has now become the foundation of applied research in both
academic and government institutions.
In the first subsection, I describe the information frictions. In the second subsec-
7
tion, I present the standard part of the model.
1.3.1 Learning and Endogenously Countercyclical Uncertainty
I divide the presentation of the information frictions into several parts. First, I
describe the setup. Second, I express the learning process as a Kalman filtering
problem. Third, I present a simple example that illustrates the key properties of
the filtering problem. Finally, I rewrite the capital accumulation process from the
perspective of the agents. This clarifies the impact of changes in uncertainty on the
agents’ decision making.
Setup
The law of motion for capital, Kt, is subject to two types of structural disturbances:
Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + µtIt−1.
The depreciation shock, δt, follows
δt = δ − εδ,t,
where εδ,t is i.i.d. distributed from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2δ . The investment shock, µt, determines the marginal efficiency of investment. I
8
assume that µt follows the stochastic process
µt = gt−1 + (1− ρµ)µ+ ρµµt−1 + εµ,t,
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t,
where εµ,t and εg,t are i.i.d. distributed from a normal distribution with mean zero
and variance σ2µ and σ
2
g , respectively. The growth shock, gt, controls the growth rate
of µt.
4 Agents cannot directly observe the current or previous values of δt, µt, and
gt. This informational assumption gives rise to a non-invertibility problem: Agents
cannot tell whether an unexpectedly high realization of capital stock is due to a high
efficiency of investment or to a low depreciation rate of capital. As a result, they face
a signal-extraction problem in forecasting the evolution of the shocks. Agents use all
available information, including the path of capital stock, to form their estimates.
A literal interpretation of the depreciation shock is that it represents an exogenous
change in the physical depreciation rate of capital. However, as in Gourio (2012),
Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Liu et al. (2011), a broader interpretation is possible.
For example, it can represent an economic obsolescence of capital. Alternatively,
reallocation of capital may be subject to temporary frictions and could show up as
a change in the “quality” of aggregate capital.
The investment shock was originally proposed by Greenwood et al. (1988). In a
medium-scale DSGE model similar to the one employed in this paper, Justiniano et
al. (2010) have found that the shock is the most important driver of the U.S. business
cycle. In general, there are two ways to think about the investment shocks. The first
4The growth shock is not strictly necessary for the theoretical results of the paper. However, as
I show below the shock helps match some of the survey data moments.
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interpretation is that they represent disturbances that affect the transformation of
consumption goods into investment goods. The second interpretation is that they
are shocks that affect the transformation of investment goods into installed capital.
In this paper, I adopt the second interpretation.5 Then the investment shock can be
thought of as a disturbance to the intermediation ability of the financial system. An
important implication of this interpretation is that, unlike Fisher (2006), the invest-
ment shock does not affect the price of investment goods relative to consumption
goods. Thus, agents cannot back out the shocks by observing the price.
As summarized in Figure 1.1, the timing of events is as follows: At the end of
period t− 1, agents choose their investment level It−1 given the current capital level
Kt−1 and their estimates about the unobservable state. Then, at the beginning of
period t, unobservable shocks are realized. Finally, after observing the level of new
capital Kt, agents update the estimates.
The Kalman Filtering Problem
Agents update their estimates about µt and gt in an optimal (Bayesian) manner.
The learning process can be expressed as a Kalman filtering problem:
µt
gt
 =
(1− ρµ)µ
0
+
ρµ 1
0 ρg

µt−1
gt−1
+
εµ,t
εg,t
 , (1.1)
Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 = [It−1 0]
µt
gt
+Kt−1εδ,t. (1.2)
5See Justiniano et al. (2011) for supportive evidence based on a DSGE model estimation.
10
Equation (1.1) is the state equation that characterizes the evolution of the unobserv-
able state. Equation (1.2) is the measurement equation that describes the observ-
ables as a linear function of the underlying state. I point out two things regarding
the measurement equation. First, εδ,t serves as a measurement error in the filtering
system. Second, unlike standard time-invariant systems, the coefficient matrices are
time-varying.6
The key property of the system is that the signal-to-noise ratio is procyclical,
which follows from the fact that It−1
Kt−1
is procyclical. The flip side implication of this
property is that uncertainty is countercyclical. Denote Σt as the error-covariance
matrix of the unobservable states,
Σt =
Vart(µt − µ̃t) Covt(µt − µ̃t, gt − g̃t)
· · · Vart(gt − g̃t)
 ,
then the elements of Σt are decreasing in
It−1
Kt−1
. Intuitively, when agents invest less,
their estimates about the efficiency of investment are imprecise because the level
of capital stock is largely determined by the realization of the depreciation shock.
Conversely, their estimates are accurate when they invest more because the current
capital mostly reflects shocks to the efficiency of investment.
6As in Veldkamp (2005) and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), I rule out active experimen-
tation for computational reasons. Cogley et al. (2007) have shown, in the context of U.S. monetary
policy making, that the two approaches (learning with and without experimentation) produce very
similar decision rules.
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Understanding Why Uncertainty Is Countercyclical
I explain how a procyclical signal-to-noise ratio leads to countercyclical uncertainty
by going through a simpler example. In particular, assume that there is no growth
shock.7 Then the filtering problem reduces to
µt = (1− ρµ)µ+ ρµµt−1 + εµ,t, (1.3)
yt = It−1µt +Kt−1εδ,t, (1.4)
where (1.3) is the state equation and (1.4) is the measurement equation. I define
yt ≡ Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1. In period t − 1, agents enter with the mean estimate µ̃t−1
and its associated error variance Σt−1 ≡ Vart−1(µt−1 − µ̃t−1). Then, the period t− 1
prediction of µt and its associated error variance is given by
µ̃t|t−1 = (1− ρµ)µ+ ρµµ̃t−1
Σt|t−1 = ρ
2
µΣt−1 + σ
2
µ
After observing the outcome yt, they update their estimates according to
µ̃t = µ̃t|t−1 +Gaint(yt − It−1µ̃t|t−1),
7In the Appendix, I provide a full derivation with the growth shock.
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where Gaint is the Kalman gain and is given by
Gaint =
I2t−1Σt|t−1
I2t−1Σt|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Informativeness of observation
· 1
It−1︸︷︷︸
Adjustment
.
The first term represents the informativeness of observation yt and is given by the
variance of the signal divided by the total variance (the variance of the signal and
noise). The term is increasing in It−1
Kt−1
. The second term is the scale adjustment term
reflecting the fact that µt is multiplied by It−1 in the observation.
The error variance associated with µ̃t is given by
Σt = (1−GaintIt−1)Σt|t−1
=
K2t−1σ
2
δ
I2t−1Σt|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Un-informativeness of observation
·Σt|t−1.
The first line says that the error shrinks as we learn more from the observation; the
error is decreasing in the size of the Kalman gain. The second line says that the
error variance is increasing in the un-informativeness of observation (the variance of
noise divided by the total variance). Since the un-informativeness term is decreasing
in It−1
Kt−1
, Σt is decreasing in
It−1
Kt−1
. Since investment is much more volatile than cap-
ital, It−1
Kt−1
moves almost proportionally to It−1. Thus, less investment leads to more
uncertainty.
13
Implications of Time-Varying Uncertainty From the Perspective of the
Agents
How do changes in uncertainty about the current efficiency of investment affect
agents’ decision making? The key insight here is that, because shocks to the ef-
ficiency of investment are persistent, uncertainty about the current state translates
into uncertainty about the future realization of capital.
To see this, it is useful to rewrite the capital accumulation equation from the
perspective of the agent at period t− 1:
Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + (µ̃t|t−1 + ut)It−1,
where µ̃t|t−1 is the mean forecast of µt at time t − 1 and ut is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2u,t. The innovation ut takes into account not only the
exogenous innovation to µt, but also its estimation error:
ut = µt − µ̃t|t−1
= (gt−1 − g̃t−1) + ρµ(µt−1 − µ̃t−1) + εµ,t,
and hence its volatility is given by
σ2u,t = ρ
2
µΣ
11
t−1 + 2ρµΣ
12
t−1 + Σ
22
t−1 + σ
2
µ.
Thus, the fluctuation in uncertainty shows up as a fluctuation in volatility of the
innovation to the marginal efficiency of investment. Moreover, this fluctuation in
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volatility is persistent to the extent that investment is persistent.
1.3.2 Standard Part of the Model
I now describe other components of the model. The economy is composed of the
final-goods sector, intermediate-goods sector, household sector, employment sector,
and a central bank. I start by describing the production side of the economy.
The Final-Goods Sector
In each period t, the final goods, Yt, are produced by a perfectly competitive represen-
tative firm that combines a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1],
with technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
θp−1
θp
j,t dj
] θp
θp−1
.
Yj,t denotes the time t input of intermediate good j and θp controls the price elasticity
of demand for each intermediate good. The demand function for good j is
Yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−θp
Yt,
where Pt and Pj,t denote the price of the final good and intermediate good j, respec-
tively. Finally, Pt is related to Pj,t via the relationship
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P
1−θp
j,t dj
] 1
1−θp
.
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The Intermediate-Goods Sector
The intermediate-goods sector is monopolistically competitive. In period t, each firm
j rents Kj,t units of capital stock from the household sector and buys Hj,t units of
aggregate labor input from the employment sector to produce intermediate good j
using technology
Yj,t = ztK
α
j,tH
1−α
j,t .
zt is the level of total factor productivity that follows
zt = (1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + εz,t,
where εz,t is i.i.d. distributed from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2z .
Firms face a Calvo-type price-setting friction: In each period t, a firm can re-
optimize its intermediate-goods price with probability (1 − ξp). Firms that cannot
reoptimize index their price according to the steady-state inflation rate, π.
The Household Sector
There is a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In each period, household
i chooses consumption Ct, investment It, bond purchases Bt, and nominal wage Wi,t
to maximize utility:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsdt+s
[
(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)1−σ
1− σ
−
H1+ηi,t+s
1 + η
]
,
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where β is a discount factor, σ is a risk-aversion coefficient, b represents consumption
habit, η controls (the inverse of) the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and Hi,t is the
number of hours worked. dt is a preference shock that follows
dt = (1− ρd)d+ ρddt−1 + εd,t,
where εd,t is i.i.d. distributed from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
σ2d.
The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt + PtIt +Bt ≤ Wi,tHi,t +RktKt +Rt−1Bt−1 +Dt + Ai,t,
where Rkt is the rental rate of capital, Kt is the stock of capital, Rt−1 is the gross
nominal interest rate from period t − 1 to t, and Dt is the combined profit of all
the intermediate-goods firms distributed equally to each household. I assume that
households buy securities, whose payoffs are contingent on whether it can reoptimize
its wage.8 Ai,t denotes the net cash inflow from participating in state-contingent
security markets at time t.
As in Christiano et al. (2005), I add an investment adjustment cost to the capital
8The existence of state-contingent securities ensures that households are homogeneous with
respect to consumption and asset holdings, even though they are heterogeneous with respect to the
wage rate and hours because of the idiosyncratic nature of the timing of wage reoptimization. See
Christiano et al. (2005).
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accumulation equation described above:
Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + µt
(
1− S
(
It−1
It−2
))
It−1,
where
S
(
It−1
It−2
)
=
κ
2
(
It−1
It−2
− 1
)2
,
with κ > 0. Other components of the capital accumulation, like the stochastic
process of shocks or the informational structure, are exactly the same as described
in the previous section.
The Employment Sector and Wage Setting
In each period t, a perfectly competitive representative employment agency hires
labor from households to produce an aggregate labor service, Ht, using technology
Ht =
[∫ 1
0
H
θw−1
θw
i,t di
] θw
θw−1
,
where Hi,t denotes the time t input of labor service from household i and θw controls
the price elasticity of demand for each household’s labor service. The agency sells
the aggregated labor input to the intermediate firms for a nominal price of Wt per
unit. The demand function for the labor service of household i is
Hi,t =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−θw
Ht,
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where Wi,t denotes the nominal wage rate of the labor service of household i. Wt is
related to Wi,t via the relationship
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
W 1−θwi,t di
] 1
1−θw
.
Households face a Calvo-type wage-setting friction: In each period t, a household
can reoptimize its nominal wage with probability (1− ξw). Households that cannot
reoptimize index their wage according to the steady-state inflation rate, π.
The Central Bank, Resource Constraint, and Equilibrium
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR{(πt
π
)φπ( Yt
Yt−1
)φY }1−ρR
exp(εR,t),
where R is the steady-state level of the nominal interest rate, ρR is the persistence
of the rule, and φπ and φY are the size of the policy response to the deviation of
inflation and output growth from their steady states, respectively. εR,t is a monetary
policy shock and is i.i.d. distributed from a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance σ2R.
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is Ct + It = Yt. I employ a standard
sequential market equilibrium concept and hence its formal definition is omitted.
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1.4 Model Solution and Calibration
I follow Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) and solve the model using a third-order
perturbation method around its deterministic steady state.9 I use perturbation be-
cause the model has many state variables and it is the only method that delivers
an accurate solution in a reasonable amount of time (Aruoba et al. 2006). The
third-order approximation is necessary because my purpose is to analyze the direct
impact of endogenous changes in aggregate uncertainty. In a standard first-order
approximation, changes in uncertainty play no role since the decision rules of agents
are forced to follow a certainty equivalence principle. In the second-order approx-
imation, changes in uncertainty only appear in the decision rules as cross-product
terms with other state variables. Only in the third-order approximation do changes
in uncertainty show up as an independent term.
The parameterization of the model is done in two steps. In the first step, I
fix several parameter values following micro evidence or estimates found in other
papers. In the second step, I choose values of the remaining parameters by matching
the simulated moments of the model to the data. The first step reduces the number
of parameters to be calibrated and thus sharpens the exercise in the second step.
The discount factor, β, is set so that the model steady-state interest rate implied
by the Euler equation matches that of the data. The capital share is set to 0.3.
δ = 0.02 implies an annual depreciation rate of 8%. The elasticity of goods demand
θp = 21 and labor demand θw = 21 are consistent with previous estimates, for
example, Altig et al. (2011).
9The computation is carried out with Dynare (http://www.dynare.org/).
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The coefficient of risk aversion is σ = 2 and the habit persistence parameter is set
to b = 0.65. The latter value is taken from the estimates in Christiano et al. (2005).
As emphasized in Boldrin et al. (2001), a strong habit persistence parameter helps
to account for various asset pricing puzzles. Chetty et al. (2011) suggest a Frisch
elasticity of labor supply of 0.5 for a macro model that does not distinguish between
intensive and extensive margins. This leads to η = 2.
The Calvo price and wage parameters imply an average duration of one year. As
found in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano et al. (2010), prices and wages
need to be sufficiently sticky in order to account for the inflation and wage dynamics
in the data. Turning to the monetary policy parameter, I match the steady-state
inflation rate to its historical mean. The Taylor rule coefficients feature inertia with
a strong response to inflation and a weak response to output growth (Levin et al.
2006, Smets and Wouters 2007, and Justiniano et al. 2010).
I also shut off shocks other than those to the capital accumulation equation, i.e.,
I set σz = σd = σR = 0. This is motivated by the recent evidence that disturbances
to capital accumulation are a major driving force of business cycles (Justiniano et
al. 2010 and Liu et al. 2011). It also reduces some parameters and makes the pre-
sentation of the main mechanism as transparent as possible.
To determine the values of other parameters, I choose them so that the moments
simulated from the model matches the selected moments in the data.10 There are 6
10To simulate the model, I use the pruning procedure as described in Kim et al. (2008) and
Den Haan and De Wind (2012). I compute a total of 200 replications of 250 period simulations.
I throw away the initial 50 periods. For each sample I compute the business cycle moments and
then take medians across 200 replications. I checked that the results are not driven by explosive
behavior.
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parameters to calibrate: {κ, ρµ, ρg, σµ, σg, σδ}. I target the following 6 data moments:
• Macroeconomic variables:
Standard deviations of output and investment.
Correlations of investment with respect to output.
Autocorrelation of output.
• Forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters:
1st-order autocorrelation and mean size of forecast errors on nominal GDP
growth.
Table 1.1 summarizes the resulting parameter values.
The calibration of the standard deviation of the depreciation shock σδ needs
further discussion. The parameter is important because it determines the strength
of information frictions. With too small σδ, the learning problem becomes trivial.
With too large σδ, agents learn little about the aggregate state. Thus in both cases,
changes in the level of investment have a negligible effect on the level of uncertainty.
I discipline the choice of σδ by using statistics on forecast errors in the Survey of
Professional Forecasters data.11 The first row in Table 1.2 reports statistical proper-
ties of the one-quarter-ahead median forecast errors on nominal GDP growth rate.12
The second column shows that the forecast errors of GDP growth are positively au-
tocorrelated. The third column shows the mean size of forecast errors (i.e., forecast
11A similar calibration strategy has been used in, for example, Eusepi and Preston (2011) and
Görtz and Tsoukalas (forthcoming).
12I choose the nominal GDP growth rate because this is the longest forecast series available from
the survey. Also, the forecasts do not appear to be biased because the time-series average of the
forecast errors is very close to zero.
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precision). I also report the model predictions of the forecast errors for various val-
ues of σδ.
13 First note that for all values of σδ reported, the autocorrelations are
positive. This is due to the relatively high persistence parameter of the investment
growth shock, ρg. The forecast errors are autocorrelated because agents only grad-
ually realize the change in growth rate in response to an innovation to gt. As σδ
increases, the autocorrelation decreases because of the additional noise in the fil-
tering problem. On the other hand, the size of the error increases with σδ simply
because the information friction becomes more severe. I choose 100σδ = 0.015, which
matches both the autocorrelation and the size well.
As a preliminary diagnosis of the model’s performance, I compare the business
cycle moments from the data and the model in Table 1.3. The model matches the
data reasonably well, even for moments that are not explicitly targeted.
1.5 Results
In this section, I present the results. First, by comparing impulse responses and
business cycle moments, I show that the uncertainty multiplier is large. Second, I
examine the sensitivity of the size of the multiplier to different parameter values for
the shock processes. Third, I highlight the role of real and nominal rigidities by
shutting each component one-by-one. Finally, I decompose the multiplier into the
direct effect and the feedback effect.
13For the computation of the numbers reported in this Table, I only change the value of σδ and
fix other parameters at the benchmark calibration reported in Table 1.1.
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1.5.1 The Uncertainty Multiplier Is Large
I divide the presentation of the main results into two parts. First, I use impulse
responses to explain the basic mechanism of the uncertainty multiplier. Second, I
compute business cycle moments and measure the size of the multiplier.
Impulse Response Analysis
Before examining the impulse responses, I need to consider how to measure the
effects of endogenous changes in uncertainty. One potential way is to compare the
baseline model with a version of the model without any information friction (i.e.,
agents know the true value of the shocks). However, this approach is problematic
since it confounds the effects of changes in the variance of the agents’ estimates
(which is the main focus of the paper) with the effects of changes in the mean of
the estimates. Therefore, I consider a version of the model where the variance of the
estimates is held constant but agents still face information frictions. This way, I can
precisely quantify the contribution of fluctuations in uncertainty to business cycle
dynamics.
I examine the impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation investment
shock. Recall that from the perspective of the agent at the end of period t− 1, the
capital accumulation equation can be rewritten as follows:
Kt = (1− δt)Kt−1 + (µ̃t|t−1 + ut)It−1,
where ut is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
u,t. In the baseline
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model featuring the uncertainty multiplier, σ2u,t is given by
σ2u,t = ρ
2
µΣ
11
t−1 + 2ρµΣ
12
t−1 + Σ
22
t−1 + σ
2
µ.
I shut down the uncertainty multiplier by fixing expectations over σ2u,t at its steady-
state level:
σ2u,t = ρ
2
µΣ
11
ss + 2ρµΣ
12
ss + Σ
22
ss + σ
2
µ,
where Σ11ss , Σ
12
ss , and Σ
22
ss are the steady-state levels of Σ
11
t , Σ
12
t , and Σ
22
t . Figure 1.2
shows the actual and perceived levels of unobservable shocks (investment shock µt
and growth shock gt). Note that they are identical between the two simulations.
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This means that differences in the dynamics of the endogenous variables are only
due to a difference in agents’ perception of ex-ante uncertainty.
Figure 1.3 shows that the output decline is substantially deeper when the uncer-
tainty multiplier is present. This is because, as shown in Figure 1.4, in the baseline
model agents perceive an increase in uncertainty (increase in σu,t) due to a decline
in investment. This increase in uncertainty contributes to the additional drop in
output compared to the case where the uncertainty multiplier is turned off (σu,t is
held constant). Figure 1.4 also shows that the declines in other real variables are
amplified by a similar amount. However, for nominal variables like inflation and the
interest rate, the amplification is negligible.
The uncertainty multiplier amplifies the contraction in economic activity for the
14Strictly speaking, agents’ perceived level of unobservable shocks could be moderately different
between the two simulations because the signal-to-noise ratio changes due to the feedback effect.
It turns out, however, that this channel is negligible in the impulse response shown here.
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following reasons. Due to the precautionary motive, an increase in uncertainty in-
duces households to consume less and save more. However, on the saving side, the
physical capital becomes a worse hedge for aggregate shocks because the return on
capital is subject to more uncertainty. On net, this risk-aversion channel dominates
and investment falls as well.
Why, then, the working hours fall? On the one hand, the fall in consumption
induces a desire for households to supply more labor. On the other hand, since
aggregate demand is lower, firms demand less labor for a given wage. Since wages
are sticky, wages cannot adjust to accommodate more labor and thus equilibrium
hours fall. Since prices are sticky, firms increase their price markups and this leads
to a further decline in hours. The overall outcome is that output drops substantially.
It is important to stress that in my model, an increase in uncertainty generates
a simultaneous fall in output, investment, consumption, and hours. In standard
real business cycle models, an increase in uncertainty reduces consumption but also
induces a “precautionary labor supply” (Basu and Bundick 2011). As a result,
contrary to the data, consumption and hours move in opposite directions. With
nominal rigidities, the business cycle comovement is restored through countercyclical
movements in markups.
Business Cycle Moments
I measure the size of the uncertainty multiplier by computing the business cycle
moments with and without the multiplier. Figure 1.5 plots the sample path of
output from numerical simulations. The uncertainty multiplier amplifies both booms
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and recessions because uncertainty decreases during booms and increases during
recessions. To quantify the magnitude of the amplification, Table 1.4 compares
the standard deviations of output and other variables. The uncertainty multiplier
is large. In particular, the standard deviation of output is 1.33 times larger with
the multiplier.15 Other real variables like investment and hours are amplified by a
similar amount. Consistent with the findings from the impulse response analysis, for
inflation and the interest rate the amplification is negligible. Finally, Table 1.5 shows
that, for a reasonable range of parameterization of the standard deviation of the
depreciation shock, σδ, the uncertainty multiplier is sizable. For example, consider
100σδ = 0.050. While this parameterization implies that the autocorrelation is too
low and the forecast errors are too large, the uncertainty multiplier for output is
1.20.
I conclude this subsection by pointing out that the amplification results reported
above are likely to be conservative lower bounds. Including features such as non-
convex adjustment costs (Bloom 2009) or financial frictions (Gilchrist et al. 2010) in
the model would further increase the size of the uncertainty multiplier.
1.5.2 Changing the Parameters of the Shock Processes
I consider the effects of changing the parameters of the shock processes from the
benchmark calibration. The exercise provides additional insights regarding determi-
nants of the size of the uncertainty multiplier.
15The baseline numbers are derived from the HP-filtered (λ = 1600) moments. The results are
not sensitive to the choice of the detrending method. For example, when I use linearly detrended
moments, the uncertainty multiplier for output is 1.40.
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Table 1.6 reports the uncertainty multiplier for output under different parameter-
izations of the standard deviation of the investment shock σµ and the growth shock
σg. I change the ratio of the standard deviations, σµ/σg, from the benchmark cali-
bration (σµ/σg = 0.55) while keeping the standard deviation of output constant. The
multiplier is increasing in the relative size of the growth shock. Intuitively, agents
respond more to changes in uncertainty about the expected trend growth than to
those about the fluctuation around the trend. The uncertainty multiplier is also
increasing in the absolute size of the shocks. This can be seen in Table 1.7, where
I scale the standard deviations of shocks (σµ, σg, and σδ) proportionally from the
benchmark calibration. The reason is that the fluctuation in uncertainty becomes
more important to agents’ decision making as the volatility of shocks becomes larger.
The results in this subsection have an interesting implication for emerging market
economies. As shown in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), these economies feature more
volatile business cycles that could be well characterized by fluctuations in expected
growth rates.16 This suggests that the uncertainty multiplier may be much larger in
emerging markets than in the U.S.
1.5.3 The Role of Real and Nominal Rigidities
The benchmark model features several real and nominal rigidities that are absent in
a plain vanilla real business cycle model. Table 1.8 reports the uncertainty multiplier
for output under various combinations of frictions.
I highlight three observations. First, nominal rigidities are crucial for generating
16See also Boz et al. (2011), who extend Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s analysis by incorporating
a learning problem.
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sizable multipliers. The output uncertainty multiplier is 1.06 without sticky prices
and 1.01 without sticky wages. This point connects to Basu and Bundick (2011) and
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012), who argue that countercyclical markups due to
nominal rigidities are important in accounting for the quantitative effects of changes
in uncertainty. Second, although less important than nominal rigidities, frictions on
the real side of the economy also matter. The real rigidities magnify households’
response to changes in uncertainty because they make future adjustments in con-
sumption and investment more costly. Third, there are interactions among each
set of rigidities. For example, while both real rigidities only and nominal rigidities
only economies produce negligible output amplification (1.00 and 1.04, respectively),
when the full set of rigidities is present, the amplification is significant (1.33).
The findings are related to Bloom (2009), who shows that the firm-level irre-
versibilities are essential in analyzing the effects of changes in uncertainty. The re-
sults in this subsection indicate that abstracting from a realistic amount of rigidities
may result in an underestimation of the size of the uncertainty multiplier.
1.5.4 The Role of the Feedback Effect
An interesting property of my model is that it features a two-way feedback mech-
anism between uncertainty and economic activity. Amplification of investment due
to uncertainty leads to even more amplification, because uncertainty itself is also
amplified by the amplification of investment. I assess the quantitative importance
of this channel by computing the uncertainty multiplier when the feedback effect is
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turned off.17
In particular, I assume that the agents perceive σ2u,t to evolve as follows:
σ2u,t = ρ
2
µΣ̃
11
t−1 + 2ρµΣ̃
12
t−1 + Σ̃
22
t−1 + σ
2
µ,
where Σ̃t−1 is derived from the decision rules of investment when the uncertainty
multiplier is turned off (i.e., σ2u,t = σ
2
u,ss). Table 1.9 reports the uncertainty multiplier
with and without the feedback effect. Without feedback, the uncertainty multiplier
is slightly smaller than the baseline. The feedback effect can account for about
((33− 30)/33 ≈) 10% of the total output amplification.
1.6 Survey Data Evidence
In this section, I use a unique survey data that directly measures subjective uncer-
tainty and argue that the model is consistent with the data. In particular, I show
that the model quantitatively replicates the VAR relationship between output and
uncertainty.18
Since uncertainty is an ex-ante concept, its measurement using ex-post realized
data is inherently difficult. Probabilistic forecasts reported in the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters are unique in yielding numeric values on ex-ante uncertainty for
a sufficiently long period of time. This survey asks each forecaster for a subjective
probability density of the annual percentage change in real GDP. Following the stan-
17I thank Toshi Mukoyama for suggesting this exercise.
18Bloom (2009) and Gourio (2012) conduct similar exercises.
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dard in the literature (Zarnowitz and Lambros 1987 and D’Amico and Orphanides
2008), I take the average across the standard deviations of those probability densi-
ties for each forecaster and use it as a measure of uncertainty.19 While the survey
data starts from 1968:Q4, concerns regarding data consistency and missing data
force me to conduct the analysis using the data during 1986:Q2–2011:Q4.20 Finally,
since the survey asks for the percentage change in GDP between the previous and
current calender year, there is a seasonality in the forecast horizons. For example,
in the first quarter, it is a 4-quarter-ahead-forecast. In the second quarter, it is a
3-quarter-ahead-forecast. I eliminate this seasonality by applying the Tramo-Seats
filter.21
I characterize the relationship between real GDP and uncertainty with a gener-
alized impulse response analysis (Pesaran and Lambros 1998) from a bivariate VAR
with four lags. The generalized impulse response is appealing in this context because,
in contrast to a standard recursive VAR, the results are invariant to the ordering of
variables.22 Both variables are logged and HP-filtered with λ = 1600. I emphasize
that the purpose of this exercise is to look for a statistical relationship between output
and uncertainty. Hence, no causal inference is drawn from the impulse responses.
Figure 1.6 shows that, in the data, an increase in uncertainty is associated with
19The survey asks each forecaster to place probabilities in bins spanning a wide range of outcomes
for the percentage change in real GDP. To compute the individual standard deviations, I fit a normal
distribution to the individual probabilities. For more details, see D’Amico and Orphanides (2008).
I have also tried other methods and obtained similar results.
20Nevertheless I conducted the analysis using the whole sample period and found similar results.
21Since the survey response between the current and the following year is also available, it is
possible to construct uncertainty data with different forecast horizons. I have conducted the analysis
with different forecast horizons and found similar results.
22Nevertheless I also tried a recursive VAR and obtained similar results.
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a decline in output that reaches a trough after five quarters. On the other hand,
an increase in output is associated with a decline in uncertainty. Hence the VAR
responses indicate a clear negative relationship between output and uncertainty. The
figure also shows that running a VAR on the artificial data from the model generates
impulse responses that are quantitatively in line with the actual data.23 In the model,
the negative relationship between output and uncertainty is due to the endogenous
movement in uncertainty and its feedback to real economic activity. Note that the
model replicates well the gradual responses of the two variables. This is because
uncertainty is driven by investment, which exhibits hump-shaped dynamics, and
this uncertainty in turn induces gradual adjustments by households.
1.7 Conclusion
Much learning about macroeconomic conditions seems to occur through actually
undertaking economic activity. This paper formalized the idea in an equilibrium
business cycle framework and explored its quantitative implications. Recessions are
times of high uncertainty because agents invest less and hence learn less about the
state of the economy. The endogenous fluctuations in aggregate uncertainty interact
with rigidities and amplify business cycles.
Because the level of learning is tied to the level of investment, changes in un-
certainty are large and persistent. As a result, the uncertainty multiplier is sizable.
Under the benchmark calibration, it amplifies the standard deviation of output by
23In the model, I define uncertainty as the standard deviation of the density forecast (conditional
on the agents’ information sets) of the annual percentage change in output: Stdt+s|t(∆Yt+s). The
forecast horizon is chosen in a way consistent with the survey data.
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33%. Other real variables, such as investment and hours, are also amplified by a sim-
ilar amount. Thus, the uncertainty multiplier could be a key force that transforms
relatively small shocks into larger business cycles.
My framework opens the door to a set of exciting questions. First, in this pa-
per changes in uncertainty propagate through households’ precautionary motive and
countercyclical markups. It would be useful to explore alternative channels through
which endogenous uncertainty amplifies business cycles. One such example would
be financial frictions. Second, we need to know how we should conduct monetary
policy under fluctuating uncertainty. Could we set policy in a way that reduces the
economy’s response to changes in uncertainty? Does it matter whether uncertainty
is exogenous or endogenous? I plan to address these issues in future research.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Parameters and targets
Description Value Comments/Targets
Technology and preference
β Discount factor 0.9948 Historical mean of interest rate
θp Goods demand elasticity 21 5% price markup (Altig et al. 2011)
θw Labor demand elasticity 21 5% wage markup (Altig et al. 2011)
α Capital share 0.3 Standard choice
δ Depreciation rate 0.02 8% annual depreciation
σ Risk aversion 2 Standard choice
η Inverse Frisch elasticity 2 Frisch elasticity = 0.5 (Chetty et al. 2011)
b Habit persistence 0.65 Christiano et al. (2005)
κ Investment adj. cost 0.3 Calibrated
ξp Calvo price 0.75 Duration of price 4 quarters
ξw Calvo wage 0.75 Duration of wage 4 quarters
Monetary policy
π SS inflation rate 1.0095 Historical mean of inflation rate
ρR Taylor rule smoothing 0.9 Standard choice
φπ Taylor rule inflation 2 Standard choice
φY Taylor rule output growth 0.1 Standard choice
Shock process
ρµ Investment level 0.9 Calibrated
ρg Investment growth 0.86 Calibrated
100σµ Investment level 0.43 Calibrated
100σg Investment growth 0.775 Calibrated
100σδ Depreciation 0.015 Calibrated
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Table 1.2: Identification of σδ from survey data moments
Corr(FE1Qt , FE
1Q
t−1) Mean(|FE
1Q
t |)
Data 0.17 0.55
Model
100σδ = 0.002 0.36 0.37
100σδ = 0.005 0.31 0.40
100σδ = 0.010 0.24 0.51
100σδ = 0.015 0.19 0.63
100σδ = 0.025 0.16 0.81
100σδ = 0.050 0.12 1.15
100σδ = 0.075 0.10 1.37
Notes: The forecast errors are multiplied by 100 to express them in percentage terms. The data
statistics are calculated using the final data vintage. As a robustness check, I calculated the
statistics using alternative data vintages and found that they are similar. For example,
(Corr(FE1Qt , FE
1Q
t−1),Mean(|FE
1Q
t |)) for the first, the third, and the fifth vintages are (0.23,
0.47), (0.18, 0.52), and (0.20, 0.54), respectively.
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Table 1.3: Business cycle moments
Std. Corr(Yt, Xt) AR(1)
Data
Output 1.61 1.00 0.87
Investment 6.31 0.94 0.87
Consumption 0.93 0.84 0.87
Hours 1.99 0.88 0.92
Real wage 0.84 0.07 0.76
Inflation 0.29 0.18 0.48
Interest rate 0.41 0.34 0.75
Model
Output 1.60 1.00 0.88
Investment 6.22 0.92 0.90
Consumption 0.71 0.61 0.85
Hours 2.42 0.99 0.85
Real wage 0.82 -0.15 0.89
Inflation 0.51 0.37 0.68
Interest rate 0.30 0.00 0.93
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs, HP-filtered (λ = 1600), and multiplied by 100
to express them in percentage terms.
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Table 1.4: The uncertainty multiplier is large
Amplification
σWith multiplier/σWithout multiplier
Output 1.33
Investment 1.30
Consumption 1.19
Hours 1.34
Real wage 1.14
Inflation 1.04
Interest rate 1.03
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600).
Table 1.5: The uncertainty multiplier for different values of σδ
Output
Corr(FE1Qt , FE
1Q
t−1) Mean(|FE
1Q
t |) amplification
Data 0.17 0.55
Model
100σδ = 0.002 0.36 0.37 1.03
100σδ = 0.005 0.31 0.40 1.14
100σδ = 0.010 0.24 0.51 1.23
100σδ = 0.015 0.19 0.63 1.33
100σδ = 0.025 0.16 0.81 1.38
100σδ = 0.050 0.12 1.15 1.20
100σδ = 0.075 0.10 1.37 1.16
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600). The forecast errors
are multiplied by 100 to express them in percentage terms.
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Table 1.6: The uncertainty multiplier is increasing in the relative size of the growth
shock
Output
Corr(FE1Qt , FE
1Q
t−1) Mean(|FE
1Q
t |) amplification
Data 0.17 0.55
Model
σµ/σg = 1.00 0.11 0.76 1.23
σµ/σg = 0.80 0.16 0.69 1.31
σµ/σg = 0.55 0.19 0.63 1.33
σµ/σg = 0.30 0.24 0.57 1.34
σµ/σg = 0.00 0.24 0.55 1.36
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600).
Table 1.7: The uncertainty multiplier is increasing in the size of shocks
Output Output
standard dev. amplification
Data 1.61
Model
(σµ, σg, σδ)× 0.85 1.09 1.21
(σµ, σg, σδ)× 0.95 1.37 1.28
(σµ, σg, σδ)× 1.00 1.60 1.33
(σµ, σg, σδ)× 1.05 1.82 1.38
(σµ, σg, σδ)× 1.15 2.65 1.45
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600).
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Table 1.8: The role of real and nominal rigidities
Consump. Investment Sticky Sticky Output
habit adj. cost price wage amplification
X X X X 1.33
X X X 1.06
X X X 1.01
X X 1.00
X X X 1.23
X X X 1.07
X X 1.04
1.00
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600). For each
specification, I scale (σµ, σg, σδ) proportionally to generate the standard deviation of output as in
the benchmark specification (σY = 1.60).
Table 1.9: The uncertainty multiplier with and without the feedback effect
Amplification Amplification without feedback
σWith multiplier/σWithout multiplier σNo feedback/σWithout multiplier
Output 1.33 1.30
Investment 1.30 1.27
Consumption 1.19 1.17
Hours 1.34 1.30
Real wage 1.14 1.12
Inflation 1.04 1.03
Interest rate 1.03 1.03
Notes: Both data and model moments are in logs and HP-filtered (λ = 1600).
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Figure 1.1: Timing of events
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Figure 1.2: The actual or perceived levels of unobservable shocks are identical be-
tween the two simulations
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Figure 1.3: The uncertainty multiplier amplifies output response
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Notes: Since third-order approximations move the ergodic distribution of endogenous variables
away from the steady state (Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2011), I report the impulse responses in
terms of percent deviation from the ergodic mean.
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Figure 1.4: Responses of other real variables are also amplified
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Figure 1.5: The uncertainty multiplier amplifies business cycles
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Figure 1.6: Impulse responses in a bivariate VAR
Output response to a one−std. increase in uncertainty
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Data Source
The data set spans the period 1969Q1 to 2011Q4.24 Whenever the data set is pro-
vided in monthly frequencies, I simply take the average to transform it into quarterly
frequencies.
Data from the National Income and Product Accounts are downloaded from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis website. Nominal GDP, nominal consumption (defined
as the sum of personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services), and
nominal investment (defined as the sum of gross private domestic investment and
personal consumption expenditures on durables) are divided by the civilian non-
institutional population,25 downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS
hereafter) website, to convert the variables into per capita terms. I then divide them
by the GDP deflator to convert them into real terms.
Working hours are measured by nonfarm business hours (available on the BLS
website) divided by the population. Real wages are measured by hourly compensa-
tion in nonfarm business sectors (available on the BLS website) divided by the GDP
deflator. Inflation rates are measured by changes in the GDP deflator. I use the
effective federal funds rates (downloaded from the Federal Reserve Board website)
to measure the nominal interest rates.
To compute the forecast error statistics, I use the median forecast of nominal
24I pick this starting date because the Survey of Professional Forecasters began around that time.
25Since raw population data display occasional breaks due to changes in population controls, I
use an HP-filtered (λ = 1600) trend instead.
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GDP growth rate, downloaded from the FRB Philadelphia website. The one-period-
ahead forecast error is defined as the one-period-ahead nominal GDP growth rate
forecast minus the realized nominal GDP growth rate.
1.9.2 Countercyclical Uncertainty: Full Derivation
I restate agents’ Kalman-filtering problem below:
µt
gt
 =
(1− ρµ)µ
0
+
ρµ 1
0 ρg

µt−1
gt−1
+
εµ,t
εg,t
 ,
Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 = [It−1 0]
µt
gt
+Kt−1εδ,t.
At the end of period t− 1, agents forecast the values of {µt, gt}:
µ̃t|t−1 = (1− ρµ)µ+ ρµµ̃t−1 + g̃t−1,
g̃t|t−1 = ρggt−1.
The elements of the associated forecasting error covariance matrix, Σt|t−1, are
Σ11t|t−1 = ρ
2
µΣ
11
t−1 + 2ρµΣ
12
t−1 + Σ
22
t−1 + σ
2
µ,
Σ12t|t−1 = ρµρgΣ
12
t−1 + ρgΣ
22
t−1,
Σ21t|t−1 = Σ
12
t|t−1,
Σ22t|t−1 = ρ
2
gΣ
22
t−1 + σ
2
g .
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After observing period t realization of capital, Kt, agents update their belief accord-
ing to
µ̃t = µ̃t|t−1 +
It−1Σ
11
t|t−1
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ
· {Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 − It−1µ̃t−1},
g̃t = g̃t|t−1 +
It−1Σ
12
t|t−1
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ
· {Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 − It−1µ̃t−1}.
The elements of the forecasting error covariance matrix are given by
Σ11t =
[
1−
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ
]
Σ11t|t−1,
Σ12t =
[
1−
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ
]
Σ12t|t−1,
Σ21t = Σ
12
t ,
Σ22t = Σ
22
t|t−1 −
I2t−1(Σ
12
t|t−1)
2
I2t−1Σ
11
t|t−1 +K
2
t−1σ
2
δ
.
Thus, the elements of Σt are decreasing in
It−1
Kt−1
.
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Chapter 2
Estimating DSGE Models Using
Seasonally Adjusted and
Unadjusted Data
2.1 Introduction
Most aggregate time series display large seasonal fluctuations. As Barsky and Miron
(1989) show, seasonal fluctuations account for a substantial fraction of total varia-
tions in quantity variables, such as GDP, investment, and hours worked. Neverthe-
less, the common practice among economists when estimating dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models is to simply ignore seasonality and use season-
ally adjusted data. The practice implicitly assumes that seasonal adjustments can
decompose data into seasonal and nonseasonal components, and values of interesting
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parameters can be recovered correctly. However, modern dynamic economic theory
dictates that seasonality interacts with other endogenous variables in a complex and
possibly nonlinear manner.1 Hence seasonal adjustments based on arbitrary identify-
ing restrictions would necessarily lead to distorted inference. An important question
for macroeconomists is whether those distortions are quantitatively relevant.
In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium business cycle model that can ac-
count for broad features of U.S. seasonal and nonseasonal fluctuations. Building on
recent contributions (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justini-
ano et al., 2010), the model incorporates a host of real and nominal frictions and
various types of shocks. The model is also subject to seasonal variations in tech-
nology and preference. Endogenous responses by agents to those seasonal variations
allow the model to reproduce the seasonality observed in the U.S. aggregate data. I
then simulate artificial data from the parameterized model in order to analyze the
effects of estimating DSGE models using seasonally adjusted data.
A hypothetical econometrician uses the seasonally adjusted data to estimate an
aseasonal counterpart of the baseline model using Bayesian methods. I find that
the estimated parameters differ substantially from their true values. In contrast,
when estimated with seasonally unadjusted data, most parameters are very precisely
estimated. The result is crucial, because it suggests that the conventional practice
of estimating DSGE models may lead to severely biased inference and that policy
experiments based on the estimated parameters could be misleading.
Given the significance of the finding, I devote considerable effort to studying the
1For an ellegant exposition of this issue, see Ghysels (1988).
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reasons for this distortion. Importantly, the distortions cannot be mitigated by con-
structing alternative seasonal adjustment filters, as they still arise in large sample
environments with “ideal” filters. Using frequency domain tools, I show that the ef-
fects of seasonality are not confined to the so-called seasonal frequencies but instead
are propagated across other nonseasonal frequencies. In particular, the effects are
noticeable at higher frequencies and act in ways that raise spectral power in those
regions. The intuition is relatively straightforward: Since seasonality induces agents
to reallocate their resources across seasons within a year, the effects of seasonality
are noticeable at higher frequencies. Moreover, because of seasonality, agents have
different responses across seasons to the same shocks, and this additional source of
volatility raises spectral power. I show that two key frictions in the model—the
investment adjustment cost and the nominal wage rigidity—magnify the nonlinear
interactions of seasonality and endogenous variables and make the propagation of the
seasonal components quantitatively relevant. As a result, standard seasonal adjust-
ment procedures that try to dampen spectral power only near seasonal frequencies
are not effective, and the estimated parameters have to adjust in order to compensate
for the discrepancy of spectra between seasonal and aseasonal versions of the model.
I also provide some evidence suggesting that frictions that generate large distortions
are not limited to those I assumed in the baseline model but include other general
classes of capital accumulation and labor market frictions as well.
The present paper builds on several important contributions from the previous lit-
erature. Sims (1993) and Hansen and Sargent (1993) forcefully defend the common
practice of estimating DSGE models using seasonally adjusted data. Their argu-
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ment is based on two observations. First, directly modelling seasonality may lead
to large distortions if the mechanism generating seasonality is misspecified. Second,
in most examples they consider, using seasonally adjusted data leads to fairly ac-
curate estimates. My contribution with respect to their papers is to show that, in
a state-of-the-art DSGE model that is parameterized to match certain features of
U.S. business cycle fluctuations, the second observation does not hold. I also deal
with concerns about model misspecifications in more detail later in the paper. This
paper is also related to Christiano and Todd (2002). There are two main departures
from their study. First, they focus on the effects of seasonal adjustment on busi-
ness cycle statistics. I consider the effects on a likelihood-based inference. Since a
likelihood function contains all information from cross-equation restrictions imposed
by dynamic economic theory, implications of seasonality may be quite different from
those based on arbitrary sets of moments. Moreover, since it has now become a
widely accepted approach to estimate DSGE model parameters using formal econo-
metric methods, I believe this is a relevant application for many researchers. Second,
they use a standard real business cycle model to answer their question at hand. My
model introduces additional frictions and propagation structures (e.g., habit persis-
tence, capital utilization, nominal rigidities, etc.) into their model. As I will show,
some of the new added features in my model are the key driving force of my results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section constructs a
DSGE model with seasonality. Section 3 sets up the main experiment. Section 4
reports the results and shows that seasonal adjustments lead to sizeable distortions
in parameter estimates. Section 5 identifies reasons for the distortions. Section 6
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proposes a practical procedure that helps researchers decide whether or not to include
seasonality in their models when potential model misspecifications are of concern.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Seasonal DSGE Model
The baseline seasonal model builds on a medium-scale DSGE model with a number
of real and nominal frictions, along the lines of Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and
Wouters (2007), and Justiniano et al. (2010). Following the previous literature on the
subject (e.g., Chatterjee and Ravikumar, 1992; Braun and Evans, 1995; Liu, 2000),
seasonality originates from deterministic shifts in technology and preference. Vari-
ations in technology could represent, for example, seasonal fluctuations in weather.
Variations in preferences could represent expenditures due to several kinds of social
events, such as Christmas. Presumably modelling seasonality in such a way that it
originates from deeper structures of the economy would strenghten the case for using
seasonally unadjusted data. However, the question I would like to ask in this paper is
whether even a seemingly innocuous, simple mechanism for seasonality would gener-
ate large distortions through the endogenous responses to seasonality by optimizing
agents.
The economy is composed of the final-goods sector, intermediate-goods sector,
household sector, employment sector, and a government. I will begin by describing
the production side of the economy.
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2.2.1 The Final-Goods Sector
In each period t, the final goods, Yt, are produced by a perfectly competitive represen-
tative firm that combines a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1],
with technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
θp−1
θp
j,t dj
] θp
θp−1
.
Here, Yj,t denotes the time t input of intermediate good j and θp controls the price
elasticity of demand for each intermediate good. The demand function for good j is
Yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−θp
Yt,
where Pt and Pj,t denote the price of the final good and intermediate good j, respec-
tively. Finally, Pt is related to Pj,t via the relationship
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P
1−θp
j,t dj
] 1
1−θp
.
2.2.2 The Intermediate-Goods Sector
The intermediate-goods sector is monopolistically competitive. In period t, each
firm j buys Kj,t units of capital service from the household sector and Hj,t units of
aggregate labor input from the employment sector to produce intermediate good j
using technology
Yj,t = ztK
α
j,t(XtHj,t)
1−α,
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where zt is the neutral technology shock at time t. zt follows the law of motion
ln
(
zt
zq
)
= ρz ln
(
zt−1
zq−1
)
+ εz,t, εz,t ∼ N(0, σ2z),
where zq is the steady-state level of zt in season q. α is the capital share in the
production function and Xt is a deterministic technological process that grows at
rate γ.
In period t, the firm can reoptimize its intermediate-goods price with probability
(1− ξp). Firms that cannot reoptimize index their price according to the following:
Pj,t = π
χp
t−1π
1−χpPj,t−1, where πt−1 is the inflation rate in period t−1, π is the steady-
state inflation rate (which is different from the steady-state level of the inflation rate
in season q, πq), and χp ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that controls the degree of indexation
to past inflation.
2.2.3 The Household Sector
There is a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In each period, household
i chooses consumption Ct, investment It, bond purchases Bt, and nominal wage Wi,t
to maximize utility given by the following:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
τt+s ln(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)− ϕ
H1+ηi,t+s
1 + η
]
,
where β is a discount factor, b represents consumption habit, η controls (the inverse
of) the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and Hi,t is the number of hours worked by i.
ϕ is a scale factor that determines hours worked in the steady state. I normalize
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ϕ = 1. τt is the preference shock that follows the process:
ln
(
τt
τq
)
= ρτ ln
(
τt−1
τq−1
)
+ ετ,t, ετ,t ∼ N(0, σ2τ ),
where τq is the steady-state level of τt in season q.
The household’s budget constraint is
PtCt + PtIt +Bt ≤ Wi,tHi,t +Rkt utK
p
t−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 +Dt + Ai,t + Tt.
where Rkt is the rental rate of capital, ut is the utilization rate of capital, K
p
t−1 is the
stock of physical capital, Rt−1 is the gross nominal interest rate from period t− 1 to
t, Dt is the combined profit of all the intermediate-goods firms distributed equally to
each household, and Tt are lump-sum transfers from the government. I assume that
households buy securities, whose payoffs are contingent on whether it can reoptimize
its wage.2 Ai,t denotes the net cash inflow from participating in state-contingent
security markets at time t.
Capital utilization transforms physical capital into capital services according to
Kt = utK
p
t−1.
2The existence of state-contingent securities ensures that households are homogeneous with
respect to consumption and asset holdings, even though they are heterogeneous with respect to the
wage rate and hours because of the idiosyncratic nature of the timing of wage reoptimization. See
Christiano et al. (2005).
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The physical capital stock evolves according to the following law of motion:
Kpt = (1− δ(ut))K
p
t−1 + µt
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It.
Following Greenwood et al. (1988), I assume that increasing the intensity of capital
utilization speeds up the rate of depreciation δ(ut). As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012), I adopt a quadratic formulation for the function δ:
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) +
δ2
2
(ut − 1)2,
with δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0. The function S captures the notion of adjustment costs in invest-
ment, as proposed in Christiano et al. (2005). I adopt the following specification for
S:
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
κ
2
(
It
It−1
− γ
)2
,
with κ > 0. Finally, µt is the investment technology shock that follows the process:
ln
(
µt
µq
)
= ρµ ln
(
µt−1
µq−1
)
+ εµ,t, εµ,t ∼ N(0, σ2µ),
where µq is the steady-state level of µt in season q.
2.2.4 The Employment Sector and Wage Setting
In each period t, a perfectly competitive representative employment agency hires
labor from a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], to produce an aggregate
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labor service, Ht, using technology
Ht =
[∫ 1
0
H
θw−1
θw
i,t di
] θw
θw−1
,
where Hi,t denotes the time t input of labor service from household i and θw controls
the price elasticity of demand for each household’s labor service. The agency sells
the aggregated labor input to the intermediate firms for a nominal price of Wt per
unit. The demand function for the labor service of household i is
Hi,t =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−θw
Ht,
where Wi,t denotes the nominal wage rate of the labor service of household i. Wt is
related to Wi,t via the relationship
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
W 1−θwi,t di
] 1
1−θw
.
In each period t, a household faces a probability (1−ξw) of being able to reoptimize
its nominal wage. Households that cannot reoptimize index their wage according to
the following: Wi,t = γπ
χw
t−1π
1−χwWi,t−1, where χw ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that controls
the degree of indexation to past inflation.
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2.2.5 The Government and Resource Constraint
The central bank follows a Taylor-type reaction function:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR{( πt
π?t
)φπ( Yt/Yt−1
Yq/Yq−1
)φY }1−ρR
eεR,t , εR,t ∼ N(0, σ2R).
where R is the steady-state level of the nominal interest rate, ρR is the persistence
of the rule, and φπ and φY are the size of the policy response to the deviation of
inflation and output growth from their targets, respectively. Yt/Yt−1 is the growth
rate of output in period t and Yq/Yq−1 is the steady-state growth rate of output in
season q. εR,t is an exogenous shock to the interest rate rule. π
?
t is the central bank’s
inflation target, which evolves according to
ln
(
π?t
πq
)
= ρπ ln
(
π?t−1
πq−1
)
+ επ,t, επ,t ∼ N(0, σ2π),
where πq is the steady-state inflation rate in season q.
The aggregate resource constraint is Ct + It + Gt = Yt. Gt is the amount of
government spending, which is determined as a time-varying fraction of output
Gt = gtYt,
and gt follows the process
ln
(
gt
g
)
= ρg ln
(
gt−1
g
)
+ εg,t, εg,t ∼ N(0, σ2g),
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where g is the steady-state ratio of government spending to output. Finally, the
government balances the budget constraint every period given by
Gt = −Tt.
2.2.6 Solution Method
The choice of the solution method is very important. There are currently two major
methods for solving DSGE models with seasonality. The first method is the one
used in Chatterjee and Ravikumar (1992). We log-linearize the seasonal steady state
around the balanced growth path and log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around
the log-linearized seasonal steady state (CR method). The seasonal steady state is
a periodic perfect foresight path that satisfies equilibrium conditions without uncer-
tainty for each quarter. A more accurate alternative is the one used in Braun and
Evans (1995). We directly solve for the seasonal steady state using a nonlinear so-
lution method and log-linearize the equilbrium conditions around the exact seasonal
steady state (BE method).
As is well known, a solution to a linear rational expectations system can be cast
in a state-space representation. The state-space representation could form a basis
of the Kalman filtering algorithm in building a likelihood for the estimation. The
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transition equation that characterizes the evolution of endogenous variables3 is
ŝt,q = Xq(θ)ŝt−1,q−1 + Yq(θ)εt,
where ŝt,q is a vector that collects ŝt,q = ln(st,q/sq), which is the log-deviation of a
variable st,q in time t at quarter q from its seasonal steady state sq. Xq(θ) and Yq(θ)
are the coefficient matrices that depend on a vector of the structural parameters θ,
and εt is a vector of exogenous shocks. The CR method delivers a solution that
restricts Xq(θ) = X(θ) and Yq(θ) = Y (θ) for all quarters q = 1, . . . , 4. The BE
method delivers a solution that allows Xq(θ) and Yq(θ) to take different values across
different quarters.
Now consider a seasonal adjustment procedure that substracts the seasonal steady
states from the data.4 In this case we have ŝSAt = ŝt,q, where ŝ
SA
t is a vector that col-
lects the log-deviations of the seasonally adjusted variables from their steady states.
Suppose that an econometrician fits an aseasonal DSGE model to the seasonally ad-
justed data ŝSAt . Observe that the CR method delivers consistent estimates. The BE
method, on the other hand, may deliver important distortions, since the econome-
trician is fitting a model with constant X(θ) and Y (θ) to a data generating process
where Xq(θ) and Yq(θ) are periodically varying. Since my purpose is to quantify
those distortions, I choose to work with the BE method.
3For simplicity, I assume that all endogenous variables are observable to an econometrician (i.e.,
the coefficient matrix of the observation equation is an identity matrix with no measurement error).
All of the discussion below extends to the more general case where some variables are latent.
4Note that any reasonable seasonal adjustment filter can accomplish this task.
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2.3 The Experiment
I ask whether using seasonally adjusted data leads to large distortions by estimating
model parameters with simulated data from the seasonal DSGE model. First, I need
to assign some values to the structural parameters and establish that the model is
able to match certain features of U.S. seasonal and nonseasonal fluctuations.
2.3.1 Parameterization
There are three sets of parameters. The first set of parameters are those that char-
acterize technology, preferences, and the central bank policy in the model and do
not vary over quarters. The second set of parameters are those that vary across
quarters. The first and the second sets of parameters jointly determine the seasonal
steady state. The third set of parameters are those that characterize the stochastic
shock processes.
The first set of parameters are reported in Panel A in Table 2.1. The parame-
ters are picked around the values typically calibrated or estimated in the literature.
The only parameter that deserves further attention is the parameter that controls κ
(investment adjustment cost). The value (κ = 1) is slightly smaller than the values
usually found in the literature. I assign this value because for larger adjustment
costs, I had to assume implausibly large seasonal shifts in µ (investment technology)
to match the seasonal pattern of investment observed in the U.S. data.
The second set of parameters are reported in Table 2.2. I allow the steady-state
values of z (neutral technology), τ (preference), and µ (investment technology) to
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vary across quarters. Using a numerical minimization routine and a nonlinear equa-
tion solver, I calibrate the values so that the seasonal patterns of output, investment,
and hours worked in the model match those in the data. Note that the average value
of each parameter over quarters is ensured to be unity. Table 2.3 compares seasonal
patterns in the data and in the model, given the assigned values of the first and sec-
ond set of parameters. The model fit is very good. In particular, the model correctly
predicts that seasonality is small in nominal variables such as the growth rate of real
wages and the inflation rate.5 There are two reasons for this success. First, prices
and wages are assumed to be sufficiently sticky. This makes prices and wages less re-
sponsive to seasonal shifts in z, τ , and µ. In fact, if I lower the Calvo price and wage
parameters (which implies less price and wage stickiness), I find that the seasonal
steady states of the growth rate of wages and inflation become considerably more
volatile over seasons. Second, seasonal shifts in τ (preference) effectively dampen
the seasonal fluctuations in the real interest rate. To understand this, consider the
intertemporal Euler equation as in Liu (2000):
1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
Rt
πt+1
)]
,
where λt denotes the marginal utility of consumption in period t. Suppose for a
moment b = 0 and τt = 1 for all quarters. Then λt+1/λt = Ct/Ct+1. Given the
strong seasonality in consumption observed in the U.S. data, the real interest rate
also has to exhibit strong seasonality in order to cancel out shifts in λt+1/λt. Seasonal
fluctuations in τ perform a role of seasonal adjustment in λt+1/λt so that the interest
5I fix the steady state of the nominal interest rate to be constant across quarters.
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rate becomes relatively stable across seasons.6
Finally, the third set of parameters are reported in Panel B of Table 2.1. The
parameters are chosen so that second moments of the model resemble those of the
data. In the Appendix, by comparing moments I show that overall the model is suc-
cessful in replicating business cycle features of U.S. aggregate data. I conclude that
the model serves as an empirically credible data generating mechanism for exploring
the effects of estimating DSGE models using seasonally adjusted data.
2.3.2 Estimation Using Simulated Data
Given the parameterization described above, I simulate 200 observations of artifi-
cial data sets (after throwing away the initial 100 periods). I employ a Bayesian
procedure. The likelihood is calculated based on the following vector of observables:
[∆ lnYt,∆ lnCt,∆ lnHt,∆ ln(Wt/Pt), lnπt, lnRt],
where ∆ is the first-difference operator. I conduct two different estimation experi-
ments. In the first experiment, I estimate the baseline seasonal DSGE model using
seasonally unadjusted data. In the second experiment, I estimate the aseasonal ver-
6The first-order condition for each household’s labor supply indicates that the marginal utility of
consumption is also connected to movements in real wages and hours. While strong seasonality in
hours observed in the data may suggest that wages also have to display strong seasonality in order
to compensate for the weak seasonality in the marginal utility, this is not necessarily the case in our
environment. In fact, the optimal wage for households adjusting their individual wages is relatively
constant across seasons, since wages are sticky and hence households care about the influence of
their current wage choice on their labor supply not only in the current quarter but also in future
quarters. In other words, wage-setting policies that respond to seasonal movements of hours only
in the current quarter are sub-optimal.
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sion of the baseline DSGE model using seasonally adjusted data. Specifically, during
estimation I impose zq = 1, τq = 1, and µq = 1 for all quarters q = 1, . . . , 4. All data
except for interest rates are seasonally adjusted using the X-12-Arima filter.7
During estimation, I fix g, δ0, and δ2 to the true value, since they are difficult
to identify. I also fix γ, π, and β, since most information for those parameters is
contained in the levels of data and should not be affected much by the seasonal
adjustment. Finally, I fix the steady-state price and wage markup, since I ran into
some numerical difficulties when exploring the posterior distributions.8 I assume flat
priors for all the parameters, subject to some loose boundary constraints. As pointed
out in, e.g., Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2008), with flat priors the
posterior is proportional to the likelihood function. Thus the mode of the posterior
can be interpreted as the parameter estimates of a maximum likelihood exercise.
2.4 Results
The estimates of the posterior distributions based on 200,000 draws from a random-
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm are presented in Table 2.4. There are three
things to observe. First, using seasonally unadjusted data delivers estimates that
are quite close to the true values. This is not surprising, as I am estimating a cor-
rectly specified model using unfiltered data. Second, using X-12-Arima-filtered data
7X-12-Arima is a software package developed by the U.S. Census Bureau and is the official
seasonal adjustment procedure of the U.S. government. The seasonal adjustment is conducted
using software called “Demetra,” which is provided by Eurostat.
8More specifically, the problem arises when I estimate the model using seasonally adjusted data.
I also re-estimated the model by fixing the price and wage markup at several other values and found
that the qualitative features of the results are unaffected.
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delivers distorted estimates compared to using unadjusted data. The distortions are
pronounced in some of the key structural parameters, such as α (capital share), η (in-
verse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity), κ (investment adjustment cost), ξw (Calvo
wage parameter), and φπ (Taylor rule coefficient on inflation). Third, the standard
deviations of posterior distributions are smaller when seasonally unadjusted data are
used. As discussed in Barsky and Miron (1989), seasonal fluctuations provide addi-
tional identifying restrictions that are not present in nonseasonal fluctuations, and
hence I am able to obtain sharper estimates.
In Figure 2.1, I report the log-likelihood profiles for a selected set of parameters
given seasonally unadjusted data (solid lines) and X-12-Arima-filtered data (dashed
lines).9 I move each structural parameter around its calibrated value in each panel
while fixing other parameters at their calibrated values. To facilitate comparison,
I show the true value for each parameter in a vertical line. Information drawn
from Figure 2.1 is similar to that drawn from Table 2.4. The seasonally unadjusted
likelihood peaks around the true parameter values, while the seasonally adjusted
likelihood delivers considerable biases for many structural parameters. Directions of
the biases are similar to those reported in Table 2.4.
Some readers may think that my results are sensitive to the way I seasonally
adjust the simulated data. To ensure the robustness of the results against different
choices of seasonal adjustment filters, I seasonally adjust the data using two alter-
native methods. First, I seasonally adjust using the Tramo-Seats filter.10 Second,
9The log-likelihood profiles for other parameters are given in the Appendix.
10Tramo-Seats is a time series analysis package constructed from signal extraction principles
and used extensively at the European Central Bank and Eurostat. The Bank of Spain’s website
(http://www.bde.es/servicio/software/econome.htm) provides a detailed explanation of the
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I seasonally adjust by directly using the DSGE model.11 To understand the second
procedure, recall that the law of motion for endogenous variables is given by
ŝt,q = Xq(θ)ŝt−1,q−1 + Yq(θ)εt,
where ŝt,q is a vector that collects ŝt,q = ln(st,q/sq). This can be rewritten as
st,q = sq exp(ŝt,q). To seasonally adjust st,q, replace a seasonal steady state from the
seasonal model, sq, with a steady state from the aseasonal model, s: st,q = s exp(ŝt,q).
Thus, the procedure can be thought of as regressing the data on seasonal dummies,
but in a way consistent with the DSGE model. I simply call this the “DSGE-based”
seasonal adjustment. As I show in the Appendix, for both methods, the posterior
estimates are very similar compared to when X-12-Arima-filtered data are used.
I argue that these distortions in parameter estimates are important for economic
inference because they (1) alter the transmission mechanism of shocks, (2) affect the
business cycle statistics generated by the model, and (3) bias the results of policy
analysis.
To illustrate the first point, I compare the impulse responses based on seasonally
adjusted and unadjusted estimates. Comparing impulse responses is tricky here,
since when seasonality is present the transmission of shocks differs considerably when
the quarter in which the shock hits are different. Thus I consider the following
comparison.
1. From the seasonal DSGE model, I draw parameters from the posterior distri-
procedure.
11I thank the Associate Editor for the suggestion.
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bution of seasonally unadjusted estimates and compute impulse responses. To
compute impulse responses, I first compute four versions of impulse responses,
each differing with respect to the quarter in which the shock hits. I then take
the average of the four responses. The resulting response could be thought
of as a “seasonally adjusted” impulse response (i.e., impulse response without
conditioning on a season) of the seasonal model.
2. From the aseasonal DSGE model, I draw parameters from the posterior distri-
bution of X-12-Arima-filtered estimates and compute impulse responses.
I note that the “seasonally adjusted” responses generated from the seasonal model
are almost identical to the responses generated from the aseasonal model when the
same parameter values are used. Comparing the two versions of impulse responses,
I can ask whether the impulse responses using the seasonally adjusted estimates
can successfully predict the average response across quarters. I plot mean posterior
impulse responses and their 90% point-wise intervals of a neutral technology shock
and a monetary policy shock in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Observe that the
true responses generated from the seasonal DSGE model are very close to the mean
responses of the seasonally unadjusted estimates. The responses are qualitatively
similar between the seasonally adjusted and unadjusted estimates. For example, an
exogenous improvement in technology robustly delivers hump-shaped increases in
output and investment, persistent increases in consumption and real wages, and im-
mediate declines in hours worked and inflation. An exogenous decrease in the interest
rate leads to moderate but persistent increases in output, consumption, investment,
hours, and inflation. Note, however, that there are also some important quantitative
68
differences. For example, the seasonally adjusted estimates considerably understate
output, consumption, and investment responses to an improvement in technology.
Interestingly, the responses of hours worked are precisely matched. They also under-
state output, consumption, and investment responses to an expansionary monetary
policy shock, but again the responses to hours worked are precisely matched. On the
other hand, inflation responses to a monetary policy shock are overstated.
To substantiate the second point, I compare the second moments generated from
two sources. To generate a first set of moments, I simulate data from the seasonal
model with parameters fixed at the posterior means of seasonally unadjusted esti-
mates and then seasonally adjust the data using the X-12-Arima filter. To generate
a second set of moments, I simulate data from the aseasonal model with parameters
fixed at the means of the X-12-Arima-filtered estimates. In Table 2.5, I compare those
two sets of moments, together with the moments generated from the seasonal model
under the true parameters.12 Columns under the label “Percent standard deviation”
in Table 2.5 show that the seasonally adjusted estimates considerably understate the
standard deviation of output growth and overstate the standard deviation of hours
growth, both by about 0.10. Moreover, they predict only about half the volatility of
investment growth. Columns under the label “Corr. with output growth” in Table
2.5 show that correlations with output growth are in general understated. For ex-
ample, using seasonally adjusted estimates, consumption growth correlation is less
than half of what is predicted using the true parameters or seasonally unadjusted
estimates. In evaluating those differences in moments, it is important to note that
12Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2005) document that moments generated from linear
and nonlinear likelihood estimates are considerably different.
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when the second set of moments are generated from the aseasonal model using sea-
sonally unadjusted estimates (instead of seasonally adjusted estimates), the two sets
of moments are almost identical and close to the true moments.
Finally I show that bias in point estimates translates into bias in policy anal-
ysis. I consider the following counterfactual policy experiment.13 I compute the
percent standard deviations of output growth and inflation when I increase the in-
flation response coefficient in the Taylor rule from the benchmark value (φπ = 1.7),
both for the seasonal model using seasonally adjusted estimates and the aseasonal
model using X-12-Arima-filtered estimates. Again, simulated data from the seasonal
model are adjusted using the X-12-Arima filter. The results are shown in Table 2.6.
The seasonally unadjusted estimates correctly predict the size of changes in output
growth and inflation volatilities in response to the increase in φπ. The seasonally ad-
justed estimates correctly predict the changes in inflation volatility. However, they
understate the magnitude of the increase in output growth volatility. While both
true parameters and seasonally unadjusted estimates predict that the standard de-
viation of output growth increases by about 30% compared to the benchmark case
when φπ = 10, the seasonally adjusted estimates predict that it increases by only
about 10%.
The results presented so far are important for applied macroeconomics research.
They suggest that the conventional practice of estimating DSGE models using sea-
sonally adjusted data may lead to biased inference, and hence policy experiments
13For other work on policy experiments in misspecified DSGE models, see Chang et al. (2011)
and Cogley and Yagihashi (2010).
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based on the estimated parameters could be misleading.14
2.5 Inspecting the Sources of Distortions
Why does estimating the DSGE model using seasonally adjusted data create sizeable
distortions, as reported in the previous section? In the first subsection, I show that
the main reason for the distortions is that the effects of seasonality are not restricted
to the seasonal frequencies, but instead are propagated across the entire frequency
domain. In the second subsection, I argue that the capital accumulation and labor
market frictions in the model amplify nonlinear interactions between seasonality and
endogenous variables and make the distortions quantitatively relevant.
2.5.1 Evidence From the Frequency Domain
Before turning to a detailed investigation, first it would be useful to take a look
at what the standard seasonal adjustment methods do to the data. In Figure 2.4,
I plot the sample periodogram of the simulated data (seasonally unadjusted, X-
12-Arima-filtered, Tramo-Seats-filtered, and DSGE-based-filtered data) used in the
previous section.15 First, the spectra of seasonally unadjusted data have spikes at
seasonal frequencies (ω = π and, in particular, π
2
). Second, the seasonal adjustment
14I also conducted experiments replacing ∆ ln It with ∆ lnCt as observables. In this case, using
seasonally adjusted data still leads to substantially distorted estimates. However, using seasonally
unadjusted data, the parameters controlling the government shock process (ρg and 100σg) are
imprecisely estimated due to a weak identification problem. For this reason, I focus on results that
use ∆ lnCt as observables for the rest of the paper.
15The periodogram is smoothed by taking the equally weighted average of periodograms on 7
frequencies at and in the neighborhood of each frequency ωj = 2πj/T, j = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
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procedures eliminate those seasonal spikes but leave the spectral densities at other
frequencies unaffected. These observations suggest that the distortions found in the
previous section are due to the fact that the seasonal adjustment procedures fail
to completely eliminate the effects of seasonality because seasonality also influences
the spectral densities at other nonseasonal frequencies as well. For the rest of this
section, I will formalize this argument by using a set of tools developed by previous
authors.
In Figure 2.5, for the seasonal and aseasonal DSGE models, I plot the log spec-
trum of the variables used in the estimation.16 For both models the parameters
are fixed at the values (reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2) used to generate data for
the experiment in the previous sections. The log spectrum of the seasonal model
is shown in thick solid lines, and the log spectrum of the aseasonal model is shown
in thick dashed lines. Observe that for output growth and hours growth, there are
considerable discrepancies between the spectra of the seasonal and aseasonal model
at the entire frequency domain. In particular, the discrepancies are noticeable at
high frequencies (frequencies above ω = π
2
). In those regions, the seasonal model has
more spectral power. On the other hand, for nominal variables such as wage growth,
inflation rates, and interest rates, the discrepancies are small and confined to the
seasonal freqencies (ω = π
2
, π).17
The intuition behind these discrepancies is relatively straightforward. Since sea-
sonality induces agents to reallocate their resources across seasons within a year, the
16As in Hansen and Sargent (1993), I use the formula of Tiao and Grupe (1980) to compute the
spectral densities of the seasonal model. The formula provides an expression for the mean-adjusted
periodic process, without conditioning on a season of the year.
17The coherence shows a similar pattern of discrepancies. I omit the figures to conserve space.
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discrepancies of spectra are noticeable at higher frequencies. Moreover, because of
seasonality, agents have different responses across seasons to the same shocks, and
this additional source of volatility raises the spectral power of the seasonal model.
Sims (1993) and Hansen and Sargent (1993) recommend using seasonally adjusted
data in estimating rational expectations models. Their recommendation is based on
two arguments. First, directly modelling seasonality may lead to large distortions,
if the mechanism generating seasonality is misspecified. Second, since the effects of
seasonality are likely to be confined to seasonal frequencies, dampening those sea-
sonal frequencies by seasonally adjusting the data and trying to fit aseasonal models
to the nonseasonal frequencies leads to fairly accurate estimates. In my model, the
second argument does not hold. The effects of seasonality propagate across the entire
frequency domain, and hence trying to fit the nonseasonal frequencies using the asea-
sonal version of the model leads to substantial distortions in parameter estimates.18
I consider the implications of the discrepancies of spectral densities by using a
frequency domain approximation for the probability limits of misspecified maximum
likelihood estimators developed by Hansen and Sargent (1993). The frequency do-
main approximation is useful for two reasons. First, it allows me to isolate the
effects of discrepancies of spectral densities from other factors that potentially bias
estimates (e.g., seasonal adjustment filters or weak identification due to small sam-
ples). Second, it allows me to take a closer look at which particular frequencies are
responsible for the bias.
18Ghysels (1988) presents a simple production market model demonstrating this phenomenon.
Also see Cogley (2001), Canova (2009), and Canova and Ferrroni (2011) for a related point con-
cerning the interactions of trend and cyclical components in DSGE models.
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Hansen and Sargent (1993) show that the maximum likelihood estimator of a
parameter vector θ converges almost surely to the minimizer of the following formula:
A(θ) = A1(θ) + A2(θ) + A3(θ), (2.1)
where
A1(θ) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
ln detG(ω; θ)dω,
A2(θ) =
1
2π
∫ π
−π
trace[G(ω; θ)−1F (ω)]dω,
A3(θ) = [µ− µ(θ)]′G(0; θ)−1[µ− µ(θ)].
µ is the population mean of a stationary process and F (ω) is the spectral density
function at frequency ω. µ(θ) and G(ω; θ) are the model-based mean and spectral
density function. A1(θ) captures the variance of the model-based one-step forecast
errors. A2(θ) and A3(θ) measure the distance between data and model-based spectral
densities and means, respectively. In implementing expression (2.1), it is useful to
approximate the integrals in A1(θ) and A2(θ) by Riemann sums:
Â1(θ) =
1
T
T−1∑
j=0
ln detG(ωj; θ),
Â2(θ) =
1
T
T−1∑
j=0
trace[G(ωj; θ)
−1F (ωj)],
where ωj = 2πj/T, j = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1.
The column labeled “Baseline” in Table 2.7 reports the probability limits of
74
maximum likelihood estimates when seasonally adjusted data are used. To compute
the probability limits, I apply the Riemann sum approximation of formula (2.1), with
T = 200 and G(ω; θ) generated from the aseasonal DSGE model and F (ω) generated
from the seasonal DSGE model. Zero weight is assigned to frequencies at and near
the seasonal frequencies19 and deterministic seasonal means are removed by dropping
A3(θ) from formula (2.1). This allows me to mimic an “ideal” seasonal adjustment
procedure in the frequency domain.
The biases in parameter estimates are similar to those reported in Table 2.4,
although their magnitudes are slightly smaller. In Figure 2.5, the spectral density of
the asymptotic maximum likelihood estimates is plotted in solid lines. In order to
achieve better fit in output and hours growth, the likelihood estimator tries to shift
spectral power from low to high frequencies by distorting the parameter estimates.20
Another useful measure to examine is a version of the likelihood-ratio statistic
developed in Christiano and Vigfusson (2003):
λ = 2[A(θtrue)− A(θ∗)],
where θtrue is a vector of parameters fixed at their true values and θ
∗ is a vector
of parameters fixed at their estimated values (in this case asymptotic maximum
19I impose zero weight to the 9 frequencies at and in the neighborhood of ω = π/2, and also
ω = π and the 4 next lower frequencies. The results are robust to the choice of the number of
frequencies assigned zero weight.
20As pointed out in Cogley (2001), it is difficult to develop intuition of a direction of the bias in
a particular parameter when all parameters are allowed to adjust simultaneously. This is because
sometimes the partial effects of parameter adjustments interact in ways that counteract one another.
For example, while the upward bias in α (capital share) and the downward bias in η (inverse of
the Frisch labor supply elasticity) act in ways that raise the spectral power of output and hours
growth, the upward bias in κ (investment adjustment cost) dampens it.
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likelihood estimates). Define
λ(ω) = ln detG(ω; θtrue)− ln detG(ω; θ∗) + trace[(G(ω; θtrue)−1 −G(ω; θ∗)−1)F (ω)],
so that
λ = λ(0) + 2
T/2−1∑
j=1
λ(ωj) + λ(π).
The cumulative likelihood ratio is defined as
Λ(ω) = λ(0) + 2
∑
ωj≤ω
λ(ωj), 0 < ω < π,
Λ(0) = λ(0),
Λ(π) = λ.
If bias of the estimated parameters is due to discrepancies of seasonal and aseasonal
spectra in some specific frequency region, we should see a sharp increase in Λ(ω).
Figure 2.6 shows that there is a sharp increase at medium and high frequencies.21 On
the other hand, there is a mild decrease in the ratio at low frequencies. This obser-
vation confirms that the likelihood estimator is distorting the estimated parameters
in order to acheive a better fit at higher frequencies.
2.5.2 The Role of Frictions
My model features a number of real and nominal frictions. The frictions magnify the
nonlinear interactions between seasonality and endogenous variables, which in turn
21Note that since I omit the seasonal frequencies and their neighborhood during computation of
the probability limits, the cumulative likelihood ratio is flat in that region.
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leads to larger discrepancies of spectra between the seasonal and aseasonal DSGE
models. Thus, to understand the source of bias, it is crucial to know the quantitative
role of each friction in the model. To this end, I turn off each friction of the model,
recompute the probability limits, and compare the resulting biases of the estimates
with the baseline model. I identify two key frictions—the investment adjustment
cost and the nominal wage rigidity—which play important roles.
In the column in Table 2.7 labeled “No inv. adj.,” I report the probability limits of
the maxmimum likelihood estimator when the investment adjustment cost is turned
off (κ = 0). Since the magnitude of the adjustment cost does affect the seasonal
steady states, I recalibrate seasonal shifts in neutral and investment technology and
preference in order to match the data. I also adjust the parameters characterizing
stochastic shock processes so that the model without the adjustment cost generates
realistic second moments.22 The estimated parameters come closer to the true values
compared to those reported in the column labeled “Baseline.” In particular, for
some key parameters, including α (capital share), η (inverse of the Frisch labor
supply elasticity), ξw (Calvo wage parameter), and φπ (Taylor rule coefficient on
inflation), distortions disappear almost completely. In the column labeled “No wage
rig.,” I report the probability limits when the wage rigidity is (almost) turned off
(ξw = 0.01, χw = 0). Again, I recalibrate the seasonal shifts in technology and
preference and readjust the parameters characterizing the stochastic shock processes.
22Without adjustment, the volatilities of output and hours growth become extremely large. More-
over the spectra of those variables reach their peak at the highest frequency, which is the opposite
of what we see in the data (Granger, 1966). As pointed out by Christiano and Todd (2002), since
the weight assigned in the approximation criterion to the spectra is proportional to the level of the
corresponding empirical estimates (expression 2.1), even a very small discrepancy in the spectrum
at higher frequencies creates implausibly large parameter biases.
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Similar to the case when the investment adjustment cost is turned off, the distortions
are quite small (except for the persistence parameter of government spending, ρg,
which is considerably understated). I have also examined model specifications where
habit persistence is turned off (b = 0), capital utilization is turned off (δ2 = 1000),
price rigidity is turned off (ξp = 0.01, χp = 0), price and wage indexation is turned
off (χp = 0, χw = 0), and the Taylor rule responding to a deviation of output (rather
than output growth) from the steady state. None of these alternative specifications
delivered precise estimates.23 I view these as evidence showing that the investment
adjustment cost and the nominal wage rigidity are the key frictions responsible for
creating distortions.
Given the finding, readers might guess that other forms of capital accumulation or
labor market frictions may contribute to creating distortions as well. This is indeed
the case. To formalize the argument, I consider two alternative model specifications
where (a) the investment adjustment cost is replaced with a capital adjustment cost
and (b) the sticky wage assumption is replaced with a labor adjustment cost, and
see whether the seasonal adjustment creates distortions.
For the capital adjustment cost, consider
Kpt = (1− δ(ut))K
p
t−1 + µt
(
It − S
(
Kpt
Kpt−1
)
Kpt−1
)
,
where for the functional form for S, I assume
S
(
Kpt
Kpt−1
)
=
κK
2
(
Kpt
Kpt−1
− γ
)2
.
23Details of the results are available from the author upon request.
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Similar specifications for the capital adjustment cost were used, for example, in
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Chari et al. (2000). I set κK = 24 so that the moments
generated from the capital adjustment cost model are similar to those generated
from the baseline model. The column in Table 2.7 labeled “Capital adj.” reports the
probability limits of the maximum likelihood estimator. As in the baseline model, the
capital adjustment cost model delivers sizeable distortions, although their directions
and magnitudes are somewhat different. For example, α (capital share), κ (capital
adjustment cost), and 100σµ (volatility parameter of the investment technology shock
process) are overstated. Also ρz and 100σz (persistence and volatility parameters of
the neutral technology shock process) are understated.
To investigate the role of the labor adjustment cost, I simply add a quadratic
disutility term into the household’s utility function:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
τt+s ln(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)− ϕ
H1+ηi,t+s
1 + η
− κH
2
(
Hi,t+s
Hi,t+s−1
− 1
)2]
.
I impose κH = 0.8 and recalibrate the seasonal shifts in technology and preference and
readjust the parameters characterizing the stochastic shock processes. The column
in Table 2.7 labeled “Labor adj.” reports the probability limits of the maximum
likelihood estimator. The labor adjustment cost model delivers considerable biases.
For example, κ (investment adjustment cost), χp (price indexation), and φπ and
φY (Taylor rule coefficients on inflation and output growth) are understated. ρg
and 100σg (parameters characterizing the stochastic process of government spending
shocks) are also imprecise. The results of the capital adjustment cost model and the
labor adjustment cost model suggest that frictions that create distortions may not
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be limited to those I assumed in the baseline model.
2.6 Practical Considerations
So far I have argued that in current DSGE models, distortions due to misspecification
arising from ignoring seasonality could be potentially large. However, this claim is
based on an experiment in a considerably restricted setting. In particular, I have
assumed that an econometrician has complete knowledge about the structure of the
economy and the mechanism generating seasonality. In practice, such knowledge is
not fully available. A researcher who ignores seasonality could be even worse off if she
introduces a grossly misspecified mechanism of seasonality (Sims 1993 and Hansen
and Sargent 1993). Thus, researchers face an important trade-off on whether to
explicitely model seasonality or not. In this section I propose a simple procedure
that helps researchers in making this decision, and I demonstrate how to use it.
A key component of the proposed procedure is to allow a coherent comparison
between seasonal and aseasonal DSGE models. Let yt,q be a vector of time-series
data in time t at quarter q. Then the mapping of data from the model is,
lnyt,q = ŝt,q + ln sq, (2.2)
for the seasonal model and
lnyt,q = ŝt + ln s+ lnkq, (2.3)
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for the aseasonal model. Here kq is a vector of seasonal dummies that is meant to
capture seasonal variations in the data that cannot be explained by the aseasonal
model. The orthogonal decomposition between ŝt and kq is consistent with a standard
practice of seasonal adjustment. kq is jointly estimated with structural parameters
of the aseasonal model. Then a researcher can evaluate the fit across specifications
by comparing the marginal likelihoods.24
I apply the mappings (2.2) and (2.3) to the simulated data used in the main
experiment. The goal of the exercise is to demonstrate the usefulness of the ap-
proach for determining whether or not to explicitely model seasonality when there is
potential danger of misspecification. I consider three examples of misspecification.
The first example is the misspecification arising from ignoring seasonality (i.e., mis-
specification arising from using the aseasonal model), which has been the main focus
of this paper. The second is the misspecification arising from the structure of the
economy that is not directly related to the mechanism generating seasonality. In
particular, I assume that a researcher thinks that the central bank responds to the
output gap but not to output growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR{( πt
π?t
)φπ(Yt
Yq
)φY }1−ρR
eεR,t , εR,t ∼ N(0, σ2R).
In the third example, the mechanism generating seasonality is misspecified. I assume
that a researcher thinks that the seasonality in preference originates from shifts in
the habit term bq, but not τq. To compare the biases across specifications in a
24In this respect, the proposed procedure resembles the one-step approach of trend estimation in
Ferroni (2011).
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systematic way, as in Ferroni (2011) I consider the following quadratic loss function
that measures overall distortions:
QL = (θ − θtrue)Σθ(θ − θtrue)′,
where θ = 1/N
∑N
i=1 θi and Σθ = 1/N
∑L
l=1(θ − θi)(θ − θi)′. Thus a larger value of
quadratic loss implies larger bias.25
Table 2.8 presents the results under various model specifications. Two things
emerge. First, when seasonality is explicitely modelled, parameter biases are likely
to be modest even when other parts of the model are misspecified. In contrast, when
seasonality is not modelled, the biases are large. This suggests that misspecification
arising from ignoring seasonality is practically important in potentially misspecified
models. For example, when both the Taylor rule and the mechanism for seasonality
is misspecified, the quadratic loss is 0.0209. This is less than half compared to
when seasonality is not modelled (0.1238 and 0.0791).26 Second, although a smaller
marginal likelihood does not necessarily imply larger parameter biases, it appears to
be a relatively good indicator for a measure of biases. Other forms of misspecifications
not considered here may imply substantially larger biases. Nevertheless, a researcher
can diagnose the presence of misspecification by comparing marginal likelihoods.
25In the vectors θ and θtrue, I only include the structural parameters that are common between
the seasonal and aseasonal models.
26When X-12-Arima-filtered data are used (Table 2.4), the quadratic loss is 0.0669.
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2.7 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom among economists is that seasonal adjustments represent an
innocuous data filtering that allows econometricians to focus on the estimation of
objects of interest with little distortion. In this paper, I have challenged that view.
Using a state-of-the-art DSGE model that can match salient features of U.S. sea-
sonal and nonseasonal fluctuations, I showed that estimation using seasonally ad-
justed data leads to important distortions. The problem cannot be mitigated by
constructing alternative seasonal adjustment filters, as the distortions still arise in
large sample environments with “ideal” filters. This is because the effects of season-
ality, which are magnified by several frictions built into the model, are propagated
across the entire frequency domain.
One limitation of the analysis in this paper is that I have focused my attention
on a full-information likelihood approach. Since the main reason for the distortions
is that agents have different responses to shocks across seasons, we may be able to
obtain better estimates by using only moments that do not condition on a season. For
example, as I mentioned in Section 4, since “seasonally adjusted” impulse responses
from the seasonal model and impulse responses from the aseasonal model are almost
identical when the same parameter values are used, it seems reasonable to perform
indirect inference by matching impulse responses of seasonally adjusted data and the
aseasonal model. A systematic investigation of this idea is left for future research.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Parameters that are fixed across quarters
Parameter Description Value
Panel A: Technology, preference, policy
g SS government spending 0.19
δ0 SS depreciation rate 0.025
δ2 Curvature of utilization cost 0.1
γ SS technology growth 1.003
π SS inflation rate 1.011
β Discount factor 0.998
θp
θp−1 − 1 SS price markup 0.1
θw
θw−1 − 1 SS wage markup 0.1
α Capital share 0.3
b Habit persistence 0.7
η Inverse Frisch elasticity 2
κ Investment adjustment cost 1
ξp Calvo price 0.6
ξw Calvo wage 0.6
χp Price indexation 0.3
χw Wage indexation 0.3
ρR Taylor rule smoothing 0.7
φπ Taylor rule inflation 1.7
φY Taylor rule output 0.2
Panel B: Shock process
ρz Neutral technology 0.95
ρτ Preference 0.95
ρµ Investment technology 0.95
ρπ Inflaton target 0.95
ρg Government spending 0.95
100σz Neutral technology 0.9
100στ Preference 1.7
100σµ Investment technology 1.4
100σπ Inflation target 0.1
100σR Monetary policy 0.1
100σg Government spending 1
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Table 2.2: Parameters that vary across quarters
Parameter Description Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Average
zq Neutral technology 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00
τq Preference 0.85 1.04 1.01 1.10 1.00
µq Investment technology 0.88 1.06 0.98 1.08 1.00
Table 2.3: Seasonal patterns
Data Model
Series Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Output∗ -6.37 3.08 0.61 2.69 -6.37 3.08 0.61 2.69
Consumption -6.50 2.27 0.09 4.14 -5.59 2.07 0.58 2.94
Investment∗ -8.12 5.30 0.68 2.14 -8.11 5.30 0.68 2.14
Hours∗ -3.83 3.00 1.59 -0.59 -3.87 2.97 1.55 -0.64
Wage growth -0.45 -0.53 0.36 0.61 -0.53 0.17 0.06 0.30
Inflation rate 0.09 0.23 -0.14 -0.18 0.40 0.01 -0.06 -0.35
Interest rate -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The table reports percent changes of variables from the previous quarter, taken from
sample averages in the data and seasonal steady states in the model. Variables with ∗ indicate
those used as calibration targets.
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Table 2.4: Posterior estimates
Parameter Description True Unadjusted X-12
α Capital share 0.3 0.29 0.50
(0.0120) (0.0431)
b Habit persistence 0.7 0.73 0.71
(0.0134) (0.0270)
η Inverse Frisch elasticity 2 2.01 1.01
(0.1287) (0.1646)
κ Investment adjustment cost 1 1.03 1.49
(0.0760) (0.1905)
ξp Calvo price 0.6 0.60 0.57
(0.0024) (0.0084)
ξw Calvo wage 0.6 0.59 0.49
(0.0061) (0.0321)
χp Price indexation 0.3 0.30 0.33
(0.0080) (0.0311)
χw Wage indexation 0.3 0.30 0.35
(0.0112) (0.0409)
ρR Taylor rule smoothing 0.7 0.71 0.72
(0.0178) (0.0302)
φπ Taylor rule inflation 1.7 1.69 2.11
(0.1398) (0.3506)
φY Taylor rule output 0.2 0.22 0.34
(0.0499) (0.1047)
ρz Neutral technology 0.95 0.95 0.95
(0.0020) (0.0059)
ρτ Preference 0.95 0.94 0.97
(0.0091) (0.0076)
ρµ Investment technology 0.95 0.96 0.92
(0.0103) (0.0222)
ρπ Inflation target 0.95 0.96 0.95
(0.0066) (0.0105)
ρg Government spending 0.95 0.95 0.62
(0.0109) (0.1210)
(Table continues on the next page.)
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Table 2.4: Posterior estimates (continued)
Parameter Description True Unadjusted X-12
100σz Neutral technology 0.9 0.90 0.78
(0.0452) (0.0397)
100στ Preference 1.7 1.72 1.52
(0.1010) (0.1441)
100σµ Investment technology 1.4 1.68 1.41
(0.2194) (0.1878)
100σπ Inflation target 0.1 0.09 0.11
(0.0120) (0.0168)
100σR Monetary policy 0.1 0.10 0.12
(0.0054) (0.0072)
100σg Government spending 1 0.90 1.48
(0.0472) (0.1551)
z̃1 Neutral technology Q1 0.97 0.97 –
(0.0005)
z̃2 Neutral technology Q2 0.97 0.97 –
(0.0003)
z̃3 Neutral technology Q3 0.97 0.97 –
(0.0001)
τ̃1 Preference Q1 0.77 0.74 –
(0.0126)
τ̃2 Preference Q2 0.95 0.94 –
(0.0023)
τ̃3 Preference Q3 0.92 0.92 –
(0.0037)
µ̃1 Investment technology Q1 0.81 0.80 –
(0.0121)
µ̃2 Investment technology Q2 0.98 0.97 –
(0.0034)
µ̃3 Investment technology Q3 0.91 0.91 –
(0.0069)
Notes: The table reports the MCMC estimates of posterior means. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. The following reparameterizations are used: z̃q = zq/z4, τ̃q = τq/τ4, and
µ̃q = µq/µ4 for q = 1, 2, 3.
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Table 2.5: Business cycle statistics: seasonally adjusted vs. unadjusted estimates
Percent standard deviation Corr. with output growth
Series True Unadjusted X-12 True Unadjusted X-12
Output growth 0.96 0.94 0.83 – – –
Consumption growth 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.38 0.31 0.12
Investment growth 2.78 2.87 1.48 0.89 0.88 0.84
Hours growth 0.99 0.98 1.10 0.54 0.53 0.48
Wage growth 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.77 0.77 0.60
Inflation rate 0.73 0.78 0.70 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21
Interest rate 0.69 0.77 0.69 -0.18 -0.15 -0.16
Notes: True moments are calculated by applying the X-12-Arima filter to the simulated data from
the seasonal model, where the parameters are fixed at their true values. Similarly, seasonally
unadjusted moments are calculated by applying the X-12-Arima filter to the simulated data from
the seasonal model, where the parameters are fixed at the posterior means of seasonally
unadjusted estimates. X-12-Arima moments are calculated using simulated data from the
aseasonal model, where the parameters are fixed at the posterior means of X-12-Arima-filtered
estimates. I did not apply any seasonal adjustment filter to the simulated data for X-12-Arima
moments. All simulations are based on 100 replications of artificial time-series of length 200.
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Table 2.6: Percent standard deviation of variables under alternative values of φπ:
seasonally adjusted vs. unadjusted estimates
φπ
Series 1.7 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
Output growth
True 0.96 1.00 1.12 1.21 1.27
[1.00] [1.04] [1.17] [1.26] [1.32]
Unadjusted 0.95 0.97 1.11 1.20 1.26
[1.00] [1.03] [1.17] [1.26] [1.33]
X-12 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.97
[1.00] [1.00] [1.06] [1.10] [1.12]
Inflation
True 0.73 0.53 0.41 0.36 0.34
[1.00] [0.73] [0.56] [0.50] [0.47]
Unadjusted 0.77 0.55 0.42 0.37 0.35
[1.00] [0.72] [0.55] [0.49] [0.46]
X-12 0.84 0.62 0.45 0.42 0.39
[1.00] [0.74] [0.54] [0.50] [0.46]
Notes: Other monetary policy paramters are set to the true benchmark values
(ρR = 0.7, φY = 0.2). The numbers in square brackets indicate the ratios relative to the
benchmark case (φπ = 1.7). For simulation details, see the footnote of Table 2.5.
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Table 2.8: Comparison across alternative model specifications
Source of misspecification
Seasonality Misspecified Misspecified Marginal Quadratic
not modelled Taylor rule seasonality likelihood loss
5824.4 0.0039
X 5802.3 0.0157
X 5788.4 0.0135
X X 5761.8 0.0209
X 5259.2 0.1238
X X 5226.4 0.0791
Notes: The marginal likelihoods are calculated based on the modified harmonic mean estimator
by Geweke (1999). For the truncation value I use p = 0.5. Other values deliver similar results.
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Figure 2.1: Likelihood profiles: seasonally adjusted vs. unadjusted data
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Notes: The figure plots likelihood profiles for seasonally unadjusted data (solid lines) and
X-12-Arima-filtered data (dashed lines). Vertical lines signify true values.
92
Figure 2.2: Impulse response: neutral technology shock
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Notes: Each panel describes the percentage-point response to a one-standard-deviation shock.
Computations are based on 1,000 draws from the posterior distributions.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response: monetary policy shock
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Notes: Each panel describes the percentage-point response to a one-standard-deviation shock.
Computations are based on 1,000 draws from the posterior distributions.
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Figure 2.4: Log spectrum of the simulated data (output growth)
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Figure 2.5: Log spectrum of the seasonal and aseasonal model
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Notes: Thick solid and dashed lines plot spectra of seasonal and aseasonal model whose
parameters are fixed at the values used to generate data in the main experiment. Thin solid lines
plot spectra of the aseasonal model whose parameters are fixed at the asymptotic maximum
likelihood estimates when seasonally adjusted data are used.
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Figure 2.6: Cumulative likelihood ratio
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Data Source
I report the sources of data used in Table 3 in the main text and Table 2.9 in this
Appendix. The data set spans the period 1965Q1 to 2004Q4. Whenever the data
set is provided in monthly frequencies, I simply take the average to transform it into
quarterly frequencies. Both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted National Income
and Product Accounts data are downloaded from the Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis website. Nominal GDP, nominal consumption (defined as the sum of personal
consumption expenditures on nondurables and services), and nominal investment
(defined as the sum of gross private domestic investment and personal consumption
expenditure on durables) are divided by the civilian noninstitutional population,
downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS hereafter) website, to convert
the variables into per capita terms. To convert the variables into real terms, I divide
them by the consumer price index for all urban consumers, available on the BLS
website.27 Working hours are measured by aggregate weekly hours in total private
industries (available on the BLS website) divided by the population. Real wages are
measured by average hourly earnings of production workers in total private indus-
tries (available on the BLS website), divided by the CPI. Inflation rates are measured
by changes in the CPI. I use the effective federal funds rates (downloaded from the
Federal Reserve Board website) to measure the nominal interest rates.
27I use the CPI for measuring price level since the seasonally unadjusted GDP deflator is not
available.
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2.9.2 Solving the Seasonal DSGE Model
The equilibrium of the baseline seasonal DSGE model in the main text is char-
acterized by the equilibrium conditions below (B.1). To solve for the equilbrium,
I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions (B.3) around the seasonal steady states
(B.2). After carefully stacking the log-linearized equilibrium conditions so that they
are consistent with the seasonal orderings, I can obtain the law of motion of the econ-
omy using a standard solution method of linear rational expectations models. A few
words on notation: variables with a tilde denote detrended variables (Ãt = At/Xt)
and variables with a hat denote log deviations of variables from their seasonal steady
states (B̂t = ln(Bt/Bq)).
Equilbrium Conditions
K̃t
Ht
=
α
1− α
(
w̃t
rkt
)
(B.1.1)
mct =
1
ztαα(1− α)1−α
(w̃t)
1−α(rkt )
α (B.1.2)
p∗t =
θp
θp − 1
(
P nt
P dt
)
(B.1.3)
P nt =λ̃tmctỸt + ξpβEt
(
π
χp
t π
1−χp
πt+1
)−θp
P nt+1 (B.1.4)
P dt =λ̃tỸt + ξpβEt
(
π
χp
t π
1−χp
πt+1
)1−θp
P dt+1 (B.1.5)
1 =(1− ξp)(p∗t )1−θp + ξp
(
π
χp
t−1π
1−χp
πt
)1−θp
(B.1.6)
Ỹt =(p̃t)
θpztK̃
α
t H
1−α
t (B.1.7)
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(p̃t)
−θp =(1− ξp)(p∗t )−θp + ξp
(
π
χp
t−1π
1−χp
πt
)−θp
(B.1.8)
λ̃t =
γτt
γC̃t − bC̃t−1
− βbEt
(
τt+1
γC̃t+1 − bC̃t
)
(B.1.9)
1 =βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
Rt
γπt+1
)]
(B.1.10)
λ̃t =ψ̃tµt
[
1− S
(
γĨt
Ĩt−1
)
− S ′
(
γĨt
Ĩt−1
)
γĨt
Ĩt−1
]
+ βEt
[
ψ̃t+1
γ
µt+1S
′
(
γĨt+1
Ĩt
)(
γĨt+1
Ĩt
)2]
(B.1.11)
γψ̃t =βEt[λ̃t+1r
k
t+1ut+1 + ψ̃t+1(1− δ(ut+1))] (B.1.12)
λ̃tr
k
t =ψ̃tδ
′(ut) (B.1.13)
K̃t =utK̃
p
t−1 (B.1.14)
γK̃pt =(1− δ(ut))K̃
p
t−1 + µt
(
1− S
(
γĨt
Ĩt−1
))
Ĩt (B.1.15)
f 1t =f
2
t (B.1.16)
f 1t =(w̃
∗
t )
1−θw λ̃tHtw̃t + ξwβEt
(
πχwt π
1−χww̃∗t
π̃wt+1w̃
∗
t+1
)1−θw
f 1t+1 (B.1.17)
f 2t =
θw
θw − 1
(w̃∗t )
−θw(1+η)ϕH1+ηt + ξwβEt
(
πwt π
1−χww̃∗t
π̃wt+1w̃
∗
t+1
)−θw(1+η)
f2t+1 (B.1.18)
1 =(1− ξw)(w̃∗t )1−θw + ξw
(
πχwt−1π
1−χw
π̃wt
)1−θw
(B.1.19)
π̃wt =
πtw̃t
w̃t−1
(B.1.20)
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR{( πt
π?t
)φπ( Ỹt/Ỹt−1
Ỹq/Ỹq−1
)φY }1−ρR
eεR,t (B.1.21)
Ỹt =C̃t + Ĩt + gtỸt (B.1.22)
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Seasonal Steady States
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Ỹq =(p̃q)
θpzqK̃
α
q H
1−α
q (B.2.7)
(p̃q)
−θp =(1− ξp)(p∗q)−θp + ξp
(
π
χp
q−1π
1−χp
πq
)−θp
(B.2.8)
λ̃q =
γτq
γC̃q − bC̃q−1
− βb
(
τq+1
γC̃q+1 − bC̃q
)
(B.2.9)
1 =β
[
λq+1
λq
(
R
γπq+1
)]
(B.2.10)
101
λ̃q =ψ̃qµq
[
1− S
(
γĨq
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Log-linearized Equilibrium Conditions
̂̃
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m̂ct =− ẑt + (1− α) ̂̃wt + αr̂kt (B.3.2)
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γĨq
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γĨq
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̂̃
I t−1 (B.3.15)
f̂ 1t =f̂
2
t (B.3.16)
f 1q f̂
1
t =
[
(w̃∗q)
1−θw λ̃qHqw̃q + ξwβ
(
πχwq π
1−χww̃∗q
π̃wq+1w̃
∗
q+1
)1−θw
f1q+1
]
(1− θw) ̂̃w∗t
+ (w̃∗q)
1−θw λ̃qHqw̃q(
̂̃
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2.9.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.9 compares the business cycle statistics in the data and in the baseline DSGE
model (Section 3 in the main text). The model tends to underpredict the volatility
of both investment and wage growth and overstate the volatility of hours growth.
The model also tends to underpredict the correlation of consumption growth with
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respect to output growth and overpredict the correlation of both investment and wage
growth with respect to output growth. Nevertheless, overall the model is successful
in replicating salient features of the U.S. aggregate data.
Table 2.11 reports posterior estimates of the main experiment using Tramo-Seats-
filtered and DSGE-based-filtered data (Section 4 in the main text). The Tramo-Seats
filter and the DSGE-based filter deliver similar biases compared to the X-12-Arima
filter. (See, for example, the biases in some of the key structural parameters, α, η,
and κ.) As in Section 6 in the main text, I consider the quadratic loss function by
Ferroni (2011) that measures overall distortions. For the four estimation experiments
considered,
1. Seasonally unadjusted data: QL = 0.0039
2. X-12-Arima-filtered data: QL = 0.0669
3. Tramo-Seats-filtered data: QL = 0.0455
4. DSGE-based-filtered data: QL = 0.0418
The DSGE-based-filtered data deliver considerable biases, although the magnitude is
slightly smaller than that of the Tramo-Seats filter. I also note that all other results
in Section 4 (impulse responses, business cycle statistics, and policy analysis) are
robust to the choice of a seasonal adjustment filter. Figure 2.7 plots the log-likelihood
profiles for the model parameters given seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data.
Tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 report some model statistics of the alternative models
considered in Section 5 in the main text. I briefly comment on each alternative
model.
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1. No investment adjustment cost model: The calibrated seasonal shifts in in-
vestment technology are almost constant across seasons (Table 2.12).28 Also,
the model significantly underpredicts the volatilities of real wage growth, the
inflation rate, and the interest rate (Table 2.14).
2. No wage rigidity model: The model overpredicts seasonality and volatility in
real wage growth (Tables 2.13 and 2.14).
3. Capital adjustment cost model: The model does a good job of replicating data
moments, although it slightly underpredicts the volatilities of investment and
wage growth (Table 2.14).
4. Labor adjustment cost model: The model significantly overpredicts seasonality
and volatility in real wage growth (Tables 2.13 and 2.14). Also, it underpredicts
the correlation of seasonally adjusted hours and wage growth with respect to
output growth (Table 2.14).
28Some readers may think that the distortions in the estimated parameters in the baseline model
are driven by the seasonal shifts in investment technology. To address this issue, I recomputed the
probability limits for the baseline model but this time fixed the steady-state investment technology
level constant across seasons. The result remained basically unchanged.
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Table 2.9: Business cycle statistics
Percent standard Corr. with
deviation output growth
Series Data Model Data Model
Output growth 0.95 0.96 – –
Consumption growth 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.38
Investment growth 3.21 2.77 0.66 0.89
Hours growth 0.86 0.99 0.63 0.54
Wage growth 0.55 0.41 0.56 0.77
Inflation rate 0.75 0.73 -0.48 -0.22
Interest rate 0.76 0.69 -0.34 -0.18
Notes: Moments are calculated by applying the X-12-Arima filter to the simulated data from the
seasonal model, where the parameters are fixed at their true values. All simulations are based on
100 replications of artificial time-series of length 200.
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Table 2.10: Posterior estimates
Parameter Description True Unadjusted T-S DSGE-based
α Capital share 0.3 0.29 0.58 0.53
(0.0120) (0.0325) (0.0361)
b Habit persistence 0.7 0.73 0.66 0.67
(0.0134) (0.0255) (0.0270)
η Inverse Frisch elasticity 2 2.01 0.96 1.06
(0.1287) (0.1443) (0.1569)
κ Investment adjustment cost 1 1.03 1.44 1.55
(0.0760) (0.1681) (0.1936)
ξp Calvo price 0.6 0.60 0.56 0.56
(0.0024) (0.0073) (0.0075)
ξw Calvo wage 0.6 0.59 0.56 0.52
(0.0061) (0.0187) (0.0230)
χp Price indexation 0.3 0.30 0.34 0.31
(0.0080) (0.0322) (0.0303)
χw Wage indexation 0.3 0.30 0.33 0.35
(0.0112) (0.0309) (0.0309)
ρR Taylor rule smoothing 0.7 0.71 0.71 0.71
(0.0178) (0.0254) (0.0230)
φπ Taylor rule inflation 1.7 1.69 1.97 1.85
(0.1398) (0.2413) (0.2012)
φY Taylor rule output 0.2 0.22 0.29 0.26
(0.0499) (0.0732) (0.0664)
ρz Neutral technology 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
(0.0020) (0.0054) (0.0056)
ρτ Preference 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.97
(0.0091) (0.0050) (0.0068)
ρµ Investment technology 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.90
(0.0103) (0.0207) (0.0210)
ρπ Inflation target 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95
(0.0066) (0.0099) (0.0103)
ρg Government spending 0.95 0.95 0.27 0.52
(0.0109) (0.0903) (0.1152)
(Table continues on the next page.)
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Table 2.11: Posterior estimates (continued)
Parameter Description True Unadjusted T-S DSGE-based
100σz Neutral technology 0.9 0.90 0.83 0.84
(0.0452) (0.0416) (0.0422)
100στ Preference 1.7 1.72 1.47 1.54
(0.1010) (0.1232) (0.1356)
100σµ Investment technology 1.4 1.68 1.11 1.18
(0.2194) (0.1144) (0.1348)
100σπ Inflation target 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.10
(0.0120) (0.0142) (0.0142)
100σR Monetary policy 0.1 0.10 0.12 0.11
(0.0054) (0.0065) (0.0064)
100σg Government spending 1 0.90 1.30 1.46
(0.0472) (0.0954) (0.1464)
z̃1 Neutral technology Q1 0.97 0.97 – –
(0.0005)
z̃2 Neutral technology Q2 0.97 0.97 – –
(0.0003)
z̃3 Neutral technology Q3 0.97 0.97 – –
(0.0001)
τ̃1 Preference Q1 0.77 0.74 – –
(0.0126)
τ̃2 Preference Q2 0.95 0.94 – –
(0.0023)
τ̃3 Preference Q3 0.92 0.92 – –
(0.0037)
µ̃1 Investment technology Q1 0.81 0.80 – –
(0.0121)
µ̃2 Investment technology Q2 0.98 0.97 – –
(0.0034)
µ̃3 Investment technology Q3 0.91 0.91 – –
(0.0069)
Notes: The table reports the MCMC estimates of posterior means. Standard deviations are
reported in parentheses. The following reparameterizations are used: z̃q = zq/z4, τ̃q = τq/τ4, and
µ̃q = µq/µ4 for q = 1, 2, 3.
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Table 2.12: Parameters that vary across quarters: alternative models
Parameter Description Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Average
Panel A: No investment adjustment cost
z Neutral technology 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00
τ Preference 0.85 1.04 1.01 1.10 1.00
µ Investment technology 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: No wage rigidity
z Neutral technology 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00
τ Preference 0.84 1.04 1.01 1.10 1.00
µ Investment technology 0.87 1.06 0.99 1.08 1.00
Panel C: Capital adjustment cost
z Neutral technology 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00
τ Preference 0.85 1.04 1.01 1.10 1.00
µ Investment technology 0.94 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.00
Panel D: Labor adjustment cost
z Neutral technology 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00
τ Preference 0.84 1.04 1.02 1.10 1.00
µ Investment technology 0.87 1.05 0.99 1.09 1.00
111
Table 2.13: Seasonal patterns: alternative models
Series Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Panel A: No investment adjustment cost
Output∗ -6.32 3.18 0.59 2.55
Consumption -5.46 2.11 0.51 2.85
Investment∗ -8.20 5.55 0.76 1.89
Hours∗ -3.92 3.05 1.60 -0.73
Wage growth -0.51 0.16 0.05 0.30
Inflation rate 0.39 0.02 -0.05 -0.35
Interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: No wage rigidity
Output∗ -6.37 3.08 0.61 2.69
Consumption -5.58 2.07 0.58 2.94
Investment∗ -8.12 5.30 0.68 2.14
Hours∗ -3.87 2.96 1.55 -0.64
Wage growth -4.11 7.50 -1.13 -2.26
Inflation rate -0.02 0.66 0.16 -0.80
Interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Capital adjustment cost
Output∗ -6.38 3.08 0.61 2.69
Consumption -5.59 2.07 0.58 2.94
Investment∗ -8.12 5.31 0.68 2.14
Hours∗ -3.87 2.95 1.55 -0.64
Wage growth -0.53 0.17 0.06 0.30
Inflation rate 0.40 0.01 -0.06 -0.35
Interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D: Labor adjustment cost
Output∗ -6.37 3.08 0.61 2.69
Consumption -5.59 2.07 0.58 2.94
Investment∗ -8.11 5.30 0.68 2.14
Hours∗ -3.87 2.96 1.55 -0.64
Wage growth -13.95 26.45 -9.59 -2.92
Inflation rate -0.95 2.04 0.30 -1.39
Interest rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The table reports percent changes of variables from the previous quarter, taken from
seasonal steady states in the model. Variables with ∗ indicate those used as calibration targets.
112
Table 2.14: Business cycle statistics: alternative models
Percent standard Corr. with
Series deviation output growth
Panel A: No investment adjustment cost
Output growth 0.91 –
Consumption growth 0.55 0.23
Investment growth 2.90 0.89
Hours growth 0.86 0.92
Wage growth 0.17 0.58
Inflation rate 0.13 -0.18
Interest rate 0.18 0.18
Panel B: No wage rigidity
Output growth 0.98 –
Consumption growth 0.58 0.46
Investment growth 2.71 0.89
Hours growth 0.97 0.09
Wage growth 1.05 0.60
Inflation rate 0.73 -0.42
Interest rate 0.64 -0.32
Panel C: Capital adjustment cost
Output growth 0.94 –
Consumption growth 0.58 0.73
Investment growth 2.13 0.90
Hours growth 0.74 0.42
Wage growth 0.43 0.79
Inflation rate 0.73 -0.39
Interest rate 0.67 -0.20
Panel D: Labor adjustment cost
Output growth 0.96 –
Consumption growth 0.57 0.28
Investment growth 2.92 0.88
Hours growth 0.83 0.15
Wage growth 2.06 0.24
Inflation rate 0.72 -0.38
Interest rate 0.70 -0.26
Notes: Moments are calculated by applying the X-12-Arima filter to the simulated data from the
seasonal model, where the parameters are fixed at their true values. All simulations are based on
100 replications of artificial time-series of length 200.
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Figure 2.7: Likelihood profiles: seasonally adjusted vs. unadjusted data
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(Figure continues on the next page.)
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Figure 2.8: Likelihood profiles: seasonally adjusted vs. unadjusted data (continued)
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Notes: The figure plots likelihood profiles for seasonally unadjusted data (thick solid lines),
X-12-Arima-filtered data (thick dashed lines), Tramo-Seats-filtered data (solid lines), and
DSGE-based-filtered data (dashed lines). Vertical lines signify true values.
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